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ABSTRACT 
Retailers in rural Saskatchewan are having to contend with two predominant 
trends—rural and retail restructuring. Decreasing rural populations, increased consumer 
mobility, and the chronic instability of primary industries such as agriculture and 
forestry continue to impact rural communities in the province. The growing presence of 
multinational corporations, the drive for economies of scale, and the centralization of 
services into larger urban centers are all influencing the retail sector, particularly in rural 
areas. In response to these trends, retail co-operatives operating in Northern and Central 
Saskatchewan have joined a larger urban-based co-op in Prince Albert to form a regional 
co-operative. Co-operative theory suggests this regional structure may create internal 
obstacles for co-ops that differ from those of private firms, as co-operatives must 
consider the implications of reorganization on membership structures and member 
relations. While most of the empirical investigation has focused on large agricultural co-
operatives, less attention has been afforded to consumer co-operatives. 
Through interviews with the delegates and managers of the Prince Albert Co-
operative Association (PACA), this study examines how a multi-branch consumer co-
operative has adapted to the present rural and retail milieu. It investigates the new 
relationships that have emerged among the key stakeholders including members, 
delegates, and managers as well as the new relations between the major structures, 
namely the branches and the central body. The research is a starting point for 
understanding how member and enterprise interests are mediated, communicated, and 
coordinated within a regional co-operative. Delegates are the focal point of the study as 
they play an integral role in all of these relations. The findings of the study suggest that 
while new relationships do form within a multi-branch system, the primary relationship 
between members and their local co-op branch remains relatively unaffected.  Further, 
the study on the PACA adds to Fairtlough’s (2005) work on business structural forms 
called triarchies. It is argued that the integration of hierarchies, heterachies and 
responsible autonomy in the form of a federated network reinforces the staying power of 
the co-op in smaller communities. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The concentration of both private and public services into larger communities has 
been a major trend in rural Saskatchewan over the past fifty years. The co-operative 
response, however, has not been the complete withdrawal from smaller centers. In some 
instances, co-operatives may provide the last remaining services in a smaller rural 
community. To remain viable in locations where other businesses do not operate, co-
operatives have had to undergo their own form of restructuring. In Northern and Central 
Saskatchewan, retail co-operatives in nine towns1 have amalgamated with the larger 
urban-based co-operative in Prince Albert to form a regional association. 
 Although the impetus behind these amalgamations has been primarily economic, 
co-operatives must also consider the impact these changes have on decision-making. In a 
regional co-operative, member and community needs may be more disparate, the locus 
of decision-making may shift to the central body and member participation may decline. 
However, some scholars (Butler, 1988; Pestoff, 1991) argue that these concerns can be 
overcome if an effective membership structure is established that encourages member 
participation in governance, maintains some degree of member control in decision-
making, and enables members and management to identify and communicate needs.  
One adaptation for larger and more geographically dispersed co-operatives has 
been the delegate system. Delegates are the elected members who represent their 
                                                 
1 During the writing of the thesis in 2007, two more co-operatives in the communities of Marcelin and 
Canwood, voted to amalgamate with the PACA. By the time this thesis is published both co-operatives 
will have officially amalgamated. However, as they were not part of the PACA during the data collection, 
they are not included in most of the analysis. 
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branches at regional meetings. The extent to which these co-operatives can be said to be 
democratic and locally controlled is largely dependent on how much say delegates are 
afforded in the decision-making process in the regional association. As liaisons, 
delegates must be knowledgeable about the needs of their local co-operative and also the 
needs of the other co-operatives in the partnership, as each branch potentially brings 
unique strengths, perspectives and expectations to the larger organization.   
Because of the unique role that delegates have in larger co-operatives, they were 
selected as the entry point into understanding the relationships that exist within a larger 
consumer co-operative. Through interviews with the delegates and managers of the 
Prince Albert Co-operative Association (PACA), this study examines how a multi-
branch co-operative has adapted to the present rural and retail milieu. It investigates the 
new relationships that have emerged among the major stakeholders including members, 
delegates, and managers, and between the primary structures, specifically the branches 
and the larger co-operative in Prince Albert. The research is a starting point for 
understanding how member and enterprise interests are mediated, communicated, and 
coordinated within a regional co-operative. The findings suggest that while new 
relationships do form within a multi-branch system, the primary relationship between 
members and their local co-op remains essentially unaffected.  This study of the PACA, 
with its combination of branches, delegates and central governing body, adds to 
Fairtlough’s (2005) seminal work on business forms called triarchies. It is argued that 
integrating hierarchies, heterachies and responsible autonomy, and adopting principles 
of federated networks reinforces the staying power of the co-op in smaller communities. 
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1.2 THE PROBLEM 
The Prince Albert Co-operative Association is one of a small, yet growing number 
of retail co-operatives in Western Canada that have developed into multi-branch but 
nevertheless somewhat decentralized structures. Branches introduce new relations and 
new ways of doing business within a co-operative. Formerly independent co-operatives 
are now managed somewhat remotely from a central organization. Local boards have 
been replaced with a regional board comprised of members from the nine branches and 
the central co-operative. As a co-operative, which emphasizes democratic decision-
making, the PACA must address the shift in associational ties of members. How has this 
shift taken place within the Prince Albert Co-operative Association? What are the new 
relationships? And what lies behind the cooperative’s ability to not only maintain 
services, but also to grow and thrive in a seemingly hostile environment? 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of this study are threefold. The first objective is to present a 
general overview of some of the predominant external drivers that have led to the 
reorganization of retail co-operatives in Northern and Central Saskatchewan and to 
highlight some of the major implications these changes have had for the internal 
workings of co-operatives. The second objective is to investigate a number of the 
relationships that exist within the Prince Albert Co-operative Association drawing on co-
operative theory and using delegates’ perceptions as the starting point for the analysis. 
The third objective of the study is to increase our understanding of the relationships 
within multi-branch co-operatives and to further our capacity to conceptualize such 
arrangements by introducing and discussing a heuristic model.  
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1.4 METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
The research adopts a critical realist approach, which sees the social world as an 
open system where human agency interacts with social structures (Sayer, 1992). Critical 
realism is useful in that it is a ‘third way’ between empiricism and relativism. 
Unlike relativism/idealism, critical realism contends first that there is a 
real world independent of our knowledge about it and second, that it is possible 
to gain knowledge about the real world. Against empiricism and objectivism, 
critical realism further claims that the method of obtaining knowledge cannot be 
reduced to the observation of events (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & 
Karlsson, 2002:202). 
 
The ontology of critical realism depicts a stratified reality with three realms or 
domains—the real, the actual and the empirical (Danermark et al., 2002).  In the domain 
of the real are objects with causal powers or mechanisms that may or may not produce 
an event. When a mechanism does generate an event it comes under the actual; if the 
event is experienced it falls into the empirical domain. The events that we are 
experiencing and observing are the outcomes of a multitude of interacting mechanisms 
(i.e. they are occurring in an open system as opposed to a closed system where 
mechanisms act in isolation). As Danermark et al. (2002) state, “Social events are the 
products of a range of interacting mechanisms”. Further, objects such as institutions are 
not reducible to their parts (Sayer, 1992) or as Jaffe (2006) states the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, but the parts also have meaning. Following this, an event such 
as the formation of a regional co-operative via mergers cannot be entirely understood 
through studies of members, management and structures because the co-operative is 
operating in an open system and because co-operatives, as complex organizations, have 
their own character and dynamic.  
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Key organizational events of interest, such as the amalgamations of the co-
operatives under study, have occurred in an open system. A range of underlying factors 
has induced smaller, local co-operatives to merge with the larger co-operative based in 
Prince Albert including: the characteristics and practices of the co-operative (as a co-
operative institution and as a particular multi-branch co-operative enterprise), the 
reorganized retail sector, and the changes taking place in rural communities, economies, 
and infrastructure. Together, they constitute a complex system—a system of multiple 
structures, mechanisms and events. In complex open systems, causal connections are not 
always obvious nor are outcomes highly predictable (or pre-determined).  For Sayer 
(1992: 116), “According to conditions, the same mechanism may sometimes produce 
different events, and conversely the same type of event may have different causes”.  Co-
operatives in rural Saskatchewan for example, operate in the same general rural and 
retail environment, but not all co-ops have responded by amalgamating with neighboring 
co-operatives. Moreover, managers and boards may be faced with similar pressures to 
find economies of scale yet co-operative responses have not been identical. In particular 
instances, co-ops may close, pursue rationalization of services, or establish new 
partnerships rather than integrating as branches of a larger system. Even within the 
PACA, the paths that each local co-operative followed to become a branch have been 
varied.  
Critical realism also takes a relational approach to investigation. As might be 
expected, a complex system features multifaceted relations. By delving into the nature of 
these relations, the structure of a system can be discovered (Sayer, 1992). For this study, 
this implies learning about working relations among delegates and board members, and 
between the delegates and other actors in various parts of the regional co-operative  (e.g. 
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between delegates and members, and between delegates and managers). One cannot 
understand delegates without considering their relations with other actors in the co-
operative. Indeed, the delegate system is unnecessary if there is no separation between 
members/owners and management as there is in a co-operative. The added internal 
delegate structure forms a conduit for communication between the parties. The 
principal-agent problem, a central concern of co-operative scholars, is a relational 
problem and is affected by factors within, and outside, a co-operative. As Ish (1997: 4) 
states, “How truly representative the agents are depends on a multitude of interrelated 
factors. The relations between members and their agents (the board), or between the 
board and its agents (salaried managers) are governed by constitutions, by custom and 
by law”.  
The use of a delegate structure is itself contingent on the co-operative’s structure. 
Delegates are rarely seen in a single-entity, stand-alone co-op with a small number of 
members. Only when co-operatives develop into larger, multi-branch co-ops or 
federated structures are delegates integrated into the co-operative enterprise. 
Consideration must also be given to co-operative ideology. Delegates are deemed 
necessary because co-operatives subscribe to the principle of democratic decision-
making. The special relationship between members and their enterprise motivates, in 
large part, the implementation of representational bodies.  
Relationships and relational identities are important for, and help to define, 
organizations as well as individuals. Asymmetrical relations (in terms of power, size, 
influence, and information) exist between co-op branches and the central co-operative 
enterprise (defined here not as the whole affiliated network but as the co-operative 
unit—and associated management team—that is the strongest, largest, and typically the 
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lead enterprise in a multi-branch co-operative organization). Under most circumstances, 
the larger (urban) co-operative enterprise could likely survive and operate effectively 
without the smaller (rural) branches; the branches meanwhile are more dependent on the 
dominant co-op in the regional network (the hub in a hub-and-spoke network) for their 
viability and future development. This is true even in the Prince Albert region where, as 
a group, the branches account for over fifty percent of the sales of the regional co-
operative. Together, the branches constitute a considerable economic entity but as 
individual local outlets, their position in the industry is considerably weaker. By drawing 
the co-operatives together under one system, the central preserves and builds and is able 
draw on and “mine” the accumulated strength of the region and the regional co-op.  
In comparison to private firms, co-ops also have a special relationship to the 
retail industry in which they operate; they are, for example, affected differently by 
changes in scale and organization. Co-operatives may be compelled by industry norms 
and competition to introduce management structures similar to those of corporations 
(including hierarchical decision-making), but this can have negative repercussions for 
the associational character of the enterprise, i.e. the relations with and among members. 
Furthermore, compared to conventional firms, co-ops tend to have a special connection 
to community, which stems directly from the unique relationships that exist between a 
co-operative enterprise and its members who are its owners as well at its patrons.  
To better understand the implications of mergers (key events) and the 
organizational working relationships that have developed in their wake (the actual), the 
experiences and perspectives (the empirical domain) of delegates are investigated using 
qualitative research methods. In qualitative research, the researcher is interested in 
people’s interpretations of, and the meanings that they give to, their experiences and to 
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their constructions of the world (Merriam and Associates, 2001). Practitioners of 
qualitative research, “seek to discover and understand a phenomenon, a process, or the 
perspectives and worldview of the people involved” (Merriam & Associates, 2001).  
 The case study was selected as the method for the research. Merriam & 
Associates (2001: 8) define a case study as, “an intensive description and analysis of a 
phenomenon or social unit such as an individual, group, institution or community”. 
More specifically, the method employed could be described as an instrumental case 
study, which is designed to provide insights into a particular issue (Stake, 1995). Some 
may call this a strategic case study. The research also follows an iterative process 
common to case studies. This refers to the researcher collecting and analyzing the data 
simultaneously throughout the study (Zucker, 2001). 
1.4.1 Data Collection 
 
Empirical evidence was gathered using in-depth, semi-structured interviews that 
employ a mix of closed- and more open-ended questions that allow the interviewer to 
probe deeper into areas of interest (Payne & Payne, 2004). A list of approximately sixty 
questions covering four overarching topics was compiled and guided the researcher 
through the interviews. The questions were modified slightly depending on whether the 
interviewee was a manager or a delegate. Of the ten interviews, nine were phone 
interviews and one was conducted face-to-face. Interviews lasted anywhere from one to 
two hours and were recorded using a MP3 player.  
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1.4.2 Sample 
 
Purposeful sampling was used for this study. The population of interest for the 
investigation was the delegates from the eight branches (Air Ronge and La Ronge 
delegates are combined) and from Prince Albert. Potential subjects were contacted from 
the delegate list that was obtained from the PACA. Over one month, the researcher 
attempted to contact all the branch delegates to invite them to participate in the study. Of 
the twenty-four delegates, three were never reached, and of those contacted, eight agreed 
to do an interview. Four delegates declined to participate in the study, offering the 
explanation that they felt they did not do anything within the co-operative. Additionally, 
from the list of fifteen Prince Albert delegates, four were contacted and two of those 
took part in the interviews. In total, ten delegates and two managers were interviewed 
with an almost equal number of men and women participating. Although representation 
from each of the branches was sought, all the delegates from three of the branches 
declined to be interviewed. The timing of the study may have been an important reason 
for some delegates not wanting to participate, as the interviews were conducted at 
seeding time. It is probably not a coincidence that the three branches not represented are 
in agriculture-dependent communities. 
1.4.3 Measures 
 
Interview questions focused on how delegates view their roles as intermediaries, 
including their capacity to be effective promoters of projects that reflect the interests of 
local members and of the larger co-op. Both delegates and managers were also asked 
about their views on amalgamations, as well as communications, information-sharing 
and decision-making processes within the regional co-operative.  
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1.4.4 Additional Data Collection 
 
In addition to the above interviews, the researcher also had access to 
approximately twenty interviews that were conducted in the summers of 2004 and 2005 
with board members, branch managers and supervisors, committee members, and former 
delegates. The researcher either participated in or conducted five of these interviews. 
The interviews were part of the larger research project entitled Co-operative 
Membership and Globalization: Creating Social Cohesion through Market Relations. Of 
the twenty, approximately ten relevant interviews were used in the study. For purposes 
of comparison and to gain further insights into co-operative branch systems, the 
researcher also conducted one interview with a key informant from Pioneer Co-operative 
in Swift Current. Pioneer is also a multi-branch retail co-operative with a business 
volume and size comparable to the PACA. In total, twenty-three interviews were used in 
this study. Community census data from Statistics Canada, and a PACA business plan 
were used to compile a profile of the region. 
1.4.5 Analysis 
 
The analysis of the data followed seven steps outlined by Creswell (2003). First, 
preparation involved transcribing the interviews and organizing the data. By transcribing 
all the interviews, the researcher became quickly immersed in the data. Step two 
involved reading through transcripts, recording thoughts and becoming more familiar 
with the data. Step three is the process of coding the data, which assists in the 
identification of themes. Coding was expedited using the qualitative data analysis 
(QDA) software called Weft QDA. Weft is a simple but effective tool for categorizing 
transcripts. The program is especially useful for graduate students who have neither the 
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time nor the money to invest in more complex QDA software. The software allows the 
user to identify important categories, which then can be used in ‘theming’. Themes are 
larger and more inclusive than the categories that emerge during coding.  The categories 
were summarized into approximately four to five themes. The last two steps involved 
thinking about how these themes interrelate and interpreting the data in relation to the 
various topics.  
1.4.6 Rigor 
The researcher took a number of steps to enhance the rigor of the study. By using 
additional interviews that were part of the larger research project, the sample size was 
increased to twenty-three participants. To achieve data source triangulation, the 
researcher attempted to include: (i) more than one participant from each of the branches 
(ii) delegates from Prince Albert, (iii) responses from both managers and delegates, and 
(iv) a comparison of the PACA with another multi-branch co-op in Saskatchewan. While 
conducting the interviews, the researcher was aware of his own participation in the 
process and tried not to lead the interviewees towards particular responses2. In 
presenting the data, many of the interview responses are given as verbatim quotations to 
ensure the reader that the researcher was not tailoring the answers to fit a particular 
argument. Further, using multiple respondents and quotations to address the same theme 
was useful to demonstrate that it was not just one person’s opinion being expressed but 
that there was a shared perspective among participants. Finally, in order to become 
intimately familiar with the data the researcher personally transcribed all of the 
interviews, re-read transcripts and conducted the data analysis using QDA software.  
                                                 
2 Obviously, establishing a list of questions is already leading the participants. However, during the 
interview the researcher let the interviewee expand on issues if they so desired.  
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 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This first chapter introduces the reader to the problem to be investigated and the 
methodology employed in the study. Background reading, theoretical considerations and 
context for the study are presented in the literature review in Chapter 2. The literature 
cited for the study focuses on the major, and more recent, developments in both the retail 
industry and rural areas, which are relevant to the Saskatchewan context. Theory relating 
to the implications of co-operative growth in geographical scale and membership is also 
presented. Chapter 3 describes the study area of the research and the regional co-
operative under investigation. Communities are compared using the rural community 
descriptors presented in the literature review. Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the field 
research, where interview data are presented under specific thematic headings that 
emerged through the researcher’s analysis and interpretation of the data. The concluding 
chapter presents a summary of the findings, discussion of implications both for co-ops 
and for co-operative theory and suggestions for future research.   
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 Chapter 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
From a critical realist perspective, context is very important to our understanding 
of events. This chapter first introduces literature on some of the more prominent 
generative mechanisms impacting consumer co-operatives and small retailers in rural 
Saskatchewan. To set the context for the study, both the current rural and retail 
environments are considered. With respect to rural restructuring, the discussion focuses 
on a framework developed by Millward, Harrington, Ilbery and Beesley (2003) that 
identifies some of the potential drivers of change in rural areas.  Two typologies are 
employed to introduce possible rural descriptors and to highlight the heterogeneity 
among rural communities. For the retail grocery sector, major contemporary trends are 
identified and scholarly work looking at how service provision is shifting from rural to 
urban areas is examined. This shift in service delivery could be described as the 
regionalization of services and literature examining these developments is presented.  
The second part of the chapter discusses co-operative theory, emphasizing some 
of the key differences between co-operative enterprises and other business forms. 
Specific attention is given to co-operative growth and the potential challenges co-ops 
face as they develop into larger enterprises. Included in this section are such issues as 
member heterogeneity, participation and control. Following this, theory on the co-
operative response to growth is presented, including writings on delegates, committees 
and federated networks. The final part of the literature review introduces the concept of 
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triarchies and discusses its relevance to co-operatives, and particularly, multi-branch co-
ops. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the gaps identified in the 
literature.  
2.2 RURAL RESTRUCTURING  
Rural restructuring is a multidimensional process and much of this complexity is 
captured in a framework developed by Millward et al. (2003). The authors chart the 
dimensions of change on three axes: (i) spatial viewpoints, (ii) processes of change and 
(iii) the societal milieux.  
Spatial viewpoints, which include the local, regional, provincial, national and 
global, reflect the need for defining the point of analysis while being aware of the 
impacts from other spatial scales. Change at one level can influence development at 
other levels or cause a blurring of spatial scales. The significance of scale, or the 
reorganization of scale, cannot be overstated. The regionalization of enterprises is a 
scalar reorientation in response to (mostly) external pressures and could be conceived of 
as an attempt to (re)gain social or economic power in the face of larger, globalized 
competitors. As Swyngedouw (2004:26) states:  
…it has been suggested that the social power that can be mobilized is 
dependent on the scale or spatial level at which social actors operate. 
Consequently, the success or effectiveness of social and political strategies for 
empowerment is related to the ways in which geographical scale is actively 
considered and mobilized in struggles for social, political or economic resistance 
or change. 
 
The provision of services is increasingly being organized at a regional level. For retail 
co-operatives and members this may suggest that the new “local” is regional and 
subsequently local control must shift on a scalar level as well to effectively meet the 
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challenges of a global market. While scalar reorganization is not a launching point for 
retail co-operatives in Northern and Central Saskatchewan to become globally integrated, 
it is an attempt to find a niche in the new environment, and in so doing, to prevent 
homogenization in terms of retail enterprise form.  
On the second axis of the schema proposed by Millward et al. (2003) are four 
overarching conditions or societal milieux. These include: natural resources, material 
wealth, land values and policy intervention. Natural resources are a primary factor in the 
development of any region. Having land that was suitable for growing crops was a major 
determinant for the early development of southern Saskatchewan but a long-term decline 
in the relative value of wheat and other crops has had major repercussions for rural 
communities. The physical or environmental “wealth” of a region affects how the area 
adapts to nature’s limitations and how much of nature is exploited. In comparison to 
poorer regions, affluent areas will have more resources to overcome limitations 
presented by the environment. Closely related to affluence are land values, which also 
affect rural trajectories. Cheaper land values can attract companies seeking lower start-
up costs; higher values may signal some producers to exit the agricultural sector but 
prevent entry of young or new farmers into the industry. The fourth influential 
environment, according to Millward et al., is policy intervention. Some scholars have 
argued that government policies for rural Canada have initiated inter alia, the reduction 
of rural services, deterioration of public infrastructure, and the development of large 
intensive livestock operations (Epp & Whitson, 2001). 
The third dimension in this analytical framework is processes of change, which 
the authors divide into drivers and meta-themes. The drivers include environmental, 
technological, and socioeconomic changes. Environmental drivers can be localized 
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changes such as soil erosion or larger changes such as global warming. Technological 
drivers have reduced the need for labour in the farming, forestry and mining sectors, 
altering these rural industries and their associated communities.  Improved transportation 
has contributed to the lengthening of the commuting patterns of people in rural areas; 
refrigeration has altered consumption patterns and decreased consumer reliance on local 
retailers (Woods, 2005). The socio-economic changes include shifting gender relations, 
an aging rural demographic, and the evolving values and goals of rural society, all of 
which can vary greatly from one community to the next. In rural Canada, the two 
dominant socio-economic trends have been out migration and the aging of the 
population (Bryant & Joseph, 2001).  
Larger meta-themes of change include globalization, post-productivism and core-
periphery shifts. Millward et al. (2003) describe globalization as the increasing 
integration of world economies and the economic restructuring associated with it. 
Increased international trade, emerging global markets and other economic and political 
dimensions of globalization have varied impacts on local farmers. For rural communities, 
economic globalization has meant, in some cases, a further erosion of control over their 
economic futures (Woods, 2005). The second meta-theme, post-productivism, refers to a 
shift from the rural as primarily a place of extraction and production to one that is based 
more on consumption (e.g. the countryside repackaged as a tourist destination). The 
core-periphery shifts refer to the movement of people out of rural communities and into 
urban areas (there are also periphery-core shifts, or counterurbanization, in some 
regions), and subsequently, the further marginalization of the peripheral areas through 
the loss of human resources and services. Not every community has been equally 
impacted by these shifts. Rural depopulation and urbanization have meant that even as 
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many rural communities have lost services some others have grown in terms of 
population and business activity (Olfert & Stabler, 2000). The core-periphery could also 
describe the fate of agriculture in many rural communities, moving from a place of 
prominence in the rural economy to the periphery in terms of employment and economic 
importance (Woods, 2005).  
 The framework of Millward et al. (2003) helps to reveal the complex and 
interrelated generative mechanisms that influence (or at least have the potential to 
influence) communities and local retailers. Co-operatives have developed in the context 
of various forces and processes that interact and affect the co-operative enterprises but 
also their members and host communities as well.  As discussed below, these external 
influences inevitably contribute to changes in the internal structures of co-operative 
enterprises.  
2.2.1 Temporal Analysis 
 
These drivers of change also have a temporal dimension. For a historical 
understanding of rural restructuring and its relation to community institutions, Fuller’s 
(1997) “arena society” concept offers useful insights. The arena society is 
conceptualized as being the accumulation of three stages of rural development—the 
short distance society, the industrial society, and the open society. The conceptualization 
addresses the evolution in the links between people and their communities.  
At the earliest stage, the short distance society was characterized by relatively 
isolated settlements that were central to the lives of the inhabitants. Essentially, all the 
social, economic and political spheres of activity transpired within a single community. 
With the development of industrial society these linkages became more tenuous as the 
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spheres of influence extended over a greater geographical distance. Today, in the open 
society, human activity is even more complex with greater mobility, more information 
and more choice. Fuller explains that remnants of each earlier phase combine with 
contemporary patterns to form the arena society, and it is the socio-spatial conflicts 
between these phases that communities must now come to terms with. For rural 
Saskatchewan, the settlement patterns of the short distance society still remain and yet 
people’s activities reflect the open society where they have a much larger array of 
communities and networks to draw from to fulfill their needs and aspirations.   
Under the present circumstances within the arena society, disparities emerge 
among citizens because as Fuller (1997) states, not everyone has equal opportunity. 
Those who do not own vehicles and the rural poor are essentially excluded from network 
building. Their attachment to local communities is significantly different than those who 
are connected and can build networks outside the communities in which they reside. 
2.2.2 Rural Differentiation 
Rural communities are often thought of as having similar characteristics. It could 
be argued that most of the early European-dominated settlements in southern 
Saskatchewan had comparable functions and structures. Communities emerged as rural 
service centres and as points of collection and transport for commodities (Olfert & 
Stabler, 2000). Agriculture was the primary driver of local economies, and communities 
prospered or declined in relation to the health of the industry and the restructuring that 
went on within the sector. However, the developments that have occurred over the last 
few decades, as illustrated in the work of Millward et al. (2003) and Fuller (1997) have 
further differentiated the countryside. Change has “promoted a flowering of multiple 
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communities in rural space” (Woods, 2005: 108). The two rural typologies introduced 
below take diverse approaches in their analysis but both of them portray highly 
differentiated rural areas.   
2.2.2.1 Socio-historic Typology 
For Southcott (2003), rural differentiation in Canada is a consequence of the 
interrelations of the commodities that a region produced, the socio-historic conditions of 
the region and the predominant industrial relations of the time. Given these factors, 
Southcott arrived at six region types: urban, urban fringe, agriculture-dependent, 
resource-dependent, fishing-dependent, and Northern Native. These regions represent 
ideal types and are not mutually exclusive. The agriculture-dependent regions of the 
Prairies, where wheat was the main staple, emerged in the early 1800’s when 
competitive capitalism was predominant and were later influenced by Fordist relations. 
Resource-dependent regions are described as the most Fordist as they developed 
predominantly in the twentieth century when Fordism was prevalent. Post-industrial 
relations, which include a shift from manufacturing to the service sector and an increase 
in information technologies, characterize the urban and urban fringe regions. The 
influence of Europeans on Aboriginal traditions and a hunting and gathering economy, 
form the basis of a Northern Native region.  
2.2.2.2 Spatially-based Regions: MIZ 
A more contemporary rural typology has been developed based on the 
percentage of a community’s population that commutes to an urban center and the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics associated with each area. The Metropolitan 
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Area and Census Agglomeration Influenced Zones (MIZ) typology depicts a diverse 
rural landscape (de Peuter & Sorensen, 2005).  
The analysis yielded four zones in Saskatchewan:  Strong MIZ, Moderate MIZ, 
Weak MIZ and No MIZ. At one end of the continuum, the Strong MIZ has between 30 
and 49 percent of its employed workforce commuting to an urban core and at the other 
end, the No MIZ has no workers who commute. The MIZ findings reveal that greater 
disparities often occur within rural and small town Saskatchewan than between urban 
and rural regions. The most marked distinctions can be found between the Strong MIZ 
and the No MIZ. The Strong MIZ had the lowest unemployment rates; highest levels of 
education; highest median incomes; the greatest population increase; and the newest and 
most expensive housing. In contrast, the No MIZ had the highest unemployment and 
lowest worker participation rates; the lowest incomes and greater dependency on 
transfers for their income; the lowest number of health care providers per 1000 people; 
and the highest numbers of lone parent families.  
Together the typologies provide a basis for understanding modern rurality.  
Southcott introduces some of the historical mechanisms that created a differentiated 
countryside. The MIZ typology characterizes the present conditions of rural life and the 
importance of geographical location for communities. The availability and quality of 
essential services for one, is largely dependent on where one lives. For retailers, the 
typologies are significant as they may look to relocate to areas where consumer demand 
and purchasing power are higher, particularly to urban centers where rural residents are 
commuting. Compared to co-operatives located in No MIZ areas, co-ops operating in 
high commute areas may be under significantly more pressure to compete with stores 
located in and around the urban core.  
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2.3 RETAIL RESTRUCTURING 
The retail industry is also experiencing significant changes that impact stores 
operating in rural areas. One of the more discernible trends in retailing is concentration 
with fewer, larger companies controlling a larger portion of the market (Bromley & 
Thomas, 1993; Vias, 2004; Zafiriou, 2005). Margins in retailing are typically low and 
larger retailers are able to spread out costs (some globally) to achieve economies of scale. 
Superstores and supermarkets can sell goods at significantly lower costs than smaller 
local stores (Vias, 2004). The pressure to reduce costs is felt by smaller retailers who 
must find ways to compete on price. The competitiveness of the industry has resulted in 
a substantial decrease in the number of smaller stores across Canada. For example, the 
number of food stores across the country fell from 33,000 in 1990 to 23,000 in 2003 
(Zafiriou, 2005). 
The increase in off-farm employment and in the number of people commuting to 
work, particularly women, also alters shopping habits in rural areas. People may find it 
convenient to shop in the same community in which they work (Woods, 2005) and this 
has differential implications for retailers depending on the MIZ in which they are located. 
With less time for meal preparation, more people are interested in frozen foods and 
products offering more convenience. Developed countries such as Canada are also 
witnessing a growing demand for healthier foods and organic products (Zafiriou, 2005). 
 Demands for lower prices, larger selections, and more convenience, along with 
improved transportation have been the main drivers in shifting consumer shopping 
patterns. The impact these broad changes have had on rural retailing has not been equal 
or entirely negative (Vias, 2004).  Central place theory offers a starting point for 
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understanding why some communities see their services decline while other 
communities have a growing population and an increase in services (Olfert & Stabler, 
2000; Stabler, Olfert & Fulton, 1992). The theory features two important concepts—
demand threshold and range. Stabler and Olfert (2002b:6) state,  “The threshold is 
defined in terms of the minimum level of population and income required to support a 
particular activity, while the range refers to the maximum area that the activity in 
question can serve from a particular place”. 
Services requiring a large population base will be located in a relatively few 
larger central locations while services such as a gas station, which requires only a small 
population base to support it, will be found in most communities. As populations shift 
from the rural to the urban, services follow the population. Populations also follow the 
relocation of businesses and government services to urban centers.   
In Saskatchewan, from 1961 to 2001 there was a substantial drop in the number 
of communities in the middle categories (between the large centres offering a full range 
of services and the smallest communities offering only a minimal array of goods and 
services), with a commensurate increase in the number of communities reclassified as 
minimum convenience centres (Stabler & Olfert, 2002a). The statistics suggest that more 
communities in the province now offer only a small range of services and more and 
more of these services are concentrated in the ten major cities across the province. 
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Table 1: Saskatchewan Trade Centre Classifications 1961 & 2001 
 
Number of Communities Type 1961 2001 
Minimum Convenience Centers (MCC) 271 502 
Full Convenience Centers (FCC) 189 72 
Partial Shopping Centers (PCC) 99 6 
Complete Shopping Centers (CSC) 29 8 
Secondary Wholesale Retail (SWR) 8 8 
Primary Wholesale Retail (PWR) 2 2 
(Source: Stabler & Olfert, 2002a) 
 
Central place theory, however, largely ignores the political economy. For one, 
government policy was a significant impetus behind the centralization of services in 
Saskatchewan (Widdis, Dale-Burnett & Greenham, 2005). Moreover, central place 
theories do not specifically detail the types of businesses that continue to offer services 
in smaller communities and fail to capture the nuances of local responses. Customer-
business relations for example, are not identical. Dalal, Al-Khatib, DaCosta and Decker 
(1994) found that ‘in-town shoppers’ and ‘outshoppers’ differed in their attitudes 
towards the local clerks and merchants, and towards the services and activities within 
their communities. As might be expected, in-town shoppers were more positive about 
both. They were also likely to be older, homeowners, and long time residents.  
Another nuance not captured in central place theories are business ideologies. 
Co-operatives do not necessarily respond the same way as corporations do to similar 
pressures. Theories based on rational business decisions are not entirely effective in 
describing co-operative behavior. Co-ops place less emphasis on short-term profits, and 
have a special connection to place, which enables them to have longer “planning 
horizons” compared to corporations (Gertler, 2001). Co-ops will tend to keep operating 
in communities even after profit-seeking businesses have left (Fairbairn, Bold, Fulton, 
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Hammond Ketilson & Ish, 1991). Since co-operative emphasize use value over 
exchange value (Mooney, 2004), members may assess the utility of the co-op beyond 
narrow commercial considerations.  
Further, retail co-ops in Western Canada own their inter-provincial wholesaler 
known as Federated Co-operatives Limited (FCL or Federated). This relationship has 
allowed local co-ops to remain in operation in hundreds of smaller communities. FCL 
offers its members the purchasing power and retail expertise required to compete in the 
sector while maintaining local autonomy for co-op retailers (Fairbairn, 2003a). FCL’s 
patronage system and management expertise has been important to the survival of some 
co-ops confronting difficult economic periods (Fairbairn, 2003a). Nevertheless, the 
federated system, with its local autonomous stores, generates a ‘co-operative dilemma’, 
which emerges from the inconsistencies between the decentralized organizational 
structure and the external pressures from the retail industry for centralization (Hammond 
Ketilson, 1990).  
2.4 RESPONSE: REGIONALIZATION 
One of the responses of businesses and governments to the shifting 
characteristics of rural communities has been a restructuring of private and public 
services (Desjardins, Halseth, Leblanc & Ryser, 2002). For some governments, the 
reorganization and rescaling of public services has meant that many of the economic, 
administrative and institutional arrangements are no longer national but regional (see 
Keating, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2004; Deas & Ward, 2000). Regional development 
agencies (RDAs) for example, reflect the shift towards ‘region building’ by nation states 
(Deas & Ward, 2000).  
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For provinces in Canada, the reorganization of public services has played a role 
in regional development. A study looking at service availability trends from 1998 to 
2005 in rural communities across the country found a reduction in access to health care 
and education services (Halseth & Ryser, 2006). When considering the regional 
availability of these services however, the authors found nearly all communities had 
access to services within a 30-minute distance. Thus, services are still available for 
people in rural communities, but only if they are mobile. The study also highlights the 
significance of location, as non-metro adjacent communities were more likely to have 
access to local services than metro-adjacent communities.  That is, the closer people live 
to a city, the greater the likelihood they must travel to that city to receive essential 
services. 
The regional approach to service provision is in part a response to inadequate 
resources within a community such as the lack of entrepreneurial and community 
leadership, insufficient funding, and low populations (Diaz, Widdis & Gauthier, 2003).  
With fewer resources, many services are administered using a ‘cost-effective model’, 
resulting in the concentration of services in larger communities (Desjardins et al., 2002). 
The loss of services has forced communities to overcome these challenges using a 
variety of methods including “co-operation between services, application of generalized 
services models, clustering of services and innovative public-private-volunteer 
partnerships” (Desjardins et al., 2002:18).  
While regionalization for many private and public businesses has meant moving 
from smaller to larger communities, regionalization for co-operatives has not necessarily 
followed the same pattern. Fulton and Hammond Ketilson (1992) note that co-operatives 
and credit unions in Saskatchewan are concentrated in the minimum convenience and 
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full convenience centers.  Rice and Lavoie’s (2005) study showed that co-operatives are 
more evenly dispersed throughout Saskatchewan than private businesses.  Similarly, 
Marshall, Willis, Coombes, Raybould, and Richardson (2000) found that in England, 
mutual societies were more likely to remain in what they called socially deprived 
communities and more apt to establish branches in these locations compared to private 
banks.  
These studies imply that if a service (at least with respect to retailing and 
financial services) is being provided in smaller communities, it is likely that it is 
provided by a co-operative. However, staying in these communities has put certain 
pressures on co-operatives. These pressures relate to member differentiation and the 
internal structures of co-operatives, both of which are discussed below.    
On a final note, it should be pointed out that not all services are equal in terms of 
how easily they can be centralized. Berry (2006) identifies four components of any 
service—an information function, an expert function, a social function and a physical 
function. The author notes that whereas the information, expert and some of the social 
functions can be delivered via telecommunication networks, the physical and some of 
the social functions require an actual location. Most financial services can be readily 
centralized, as these services and financial products can be provided online or over the 
phone. For retail services, Berry (2006) distinguishes between soft (or convenience) 
goods versus hard goods. Fresh produce and clothing would be examples of soft goods, 
which consumers may prefer to see, touch or try on before purchasing. Hard goods are 
products such as books or electronics that can be selected from a catalogue or online, (i.e. 
the product does not necessarily need to be seen before the sale). Retail or supply co-ops 
offer hard products that can be centralized relatively easy. For example, farmers can 
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purchase fertilizers or bulk fuel without ever needing to enter a store. On the other hand, 
consumer co-ops stock perishable goods, such as milk, which require a physical location, 
as people want to check the expiry date and buy it immediately.  The author also notes 
that some people prefer to pay cash, which is more physically oriented, compared to 
non-cash payment methods. Given these circumstances, if a food co-op pulls out of a 
community, it is potentially detrimental to the local residents. Not only do they lose the 
physical and social functions associated with shopping, they also lose the expertise and 
information functions of the service, which are unnecessary without the physical 
location. That is, relevant information and expertise will typically only have value to 
consumers in the locations where they shop for specific soft goods.  
2.5 INTERNAL TENSIONS 
 The focus of the paper now shifts from the ‘external’ context to the ‘internal’ 
environment of co-operatives.  Co-operatives and private firms are faced with both 
external and internal pressures (Egerstrom, 2004; Fulton & Gibbings, 2000). The 
internal tensions arise from the structures and strategies within the co-operative while 
the external pressures originate from the industry (Egerstrom, 2004).  Egerstrom (2004) 
states that regardless of the ownership structure, firms must implement strategies that 
confront the external obstacles, and although the obstacles are external, the strategy for 
dealing with them must come from inside, as the firm must have a majority of its 
stakeholders supporting the new initiatives. For firms to be successful they need to 
balance the strategies for dealing with the two sets of challenges. 
 The drive for economies of scale has necessitated amalgamations within the retail 
sector, resulting in co-operatives with more members and with operations spread out 
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over a larger geographic area. The complexities of the retailing industry have meant that 
stores require qualified managers and access to specialists who can make informed 
decisions about the co-op. Although both consumer co-operatives and private retailers 
face similar pressures from the external environment, the firms’ internal environments 
may differ widely.  
2.5.1 What Makes a Co-operative’s Internal Structure Unique?  
 Definitions of co-operative stress the democratic nature of the enterprise and the 
centrality of meeting members’ needs. The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) 
defines a co-operative as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (MacPherson, 1996).  From the 
definition, the dual role of co-operatives as democratic organizations and economic 
enterprises is evident. The importance of democracy to the co-operative identity cannot 
be overemphasized—Ostergaard and Halsey (1965) have called it the cardinal principle.   
 Members as users is central to Dunn’s (1988: 85) three basic co-operative 
principles:  
The user-owner principle: Those who own and finance the co-operative are those 
who use the co-operative.  
The user-control principle: Those who control the co-operative are those who use 
the co-operative. 
The user-benefit principle: The co-operative’s sole purpose is to provide and 
distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use.  
 
Here the emphasis is on the users as owners, decision-makers and beneficiaries. 
Members are the key decision-makers in the co-operative. Control of the co-operative by 
the members takes the form of democratic control manifested in the one-member one-
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vote principle (Dunn, 1988). Dunn’s definition also highlights the importance of 
participation. In order for members to control the co-operative they must actively 
participate in the decision-making process; to receive benefits, members must be active 
users of the co-op. Member participation sets a co-operative apart from corporations. If 
there is no member participation (through the use of the co-operative’s services and/or 
participation in governance) then there is little that separates a co-operative from a 
private firm (Pestoff, 1991).  
It follows that communication is also an essential part of the co-op. Co-
operatives are established to meet members’ needs. This necessarily implies member 
participation to communicate those needs (Craig, 1993).  How needs are conveyed and 
how decisions are reached are key concerns in any co-operative.  Further, members do 
not act in isolation but must negotiate and reconcile their own wishes with the wishes of 
the other members. Fairbairn (2004: 38) describes this cognitive process:  
Members need not just a mental image of their own relationship 
to the co-op but also a mental image of other members’ relationships to 
the co-op. They need to see what different services are required by 
different member groups, how these are assessed and paid for and 
whether important cross-subsidizations occurs; otherwise they may not 
fully trust their co-operative to be a good agent for their interests. 
 
2.5.2 Conceptualizing the Co-operative Structure  
 
 The dual role of the co-operative presents contradictory logics that must be 
accommodated within a co-op. In fact, some researchers argue that competing logics is a 
defining characteristic of co-operatives (Mooney & Gray, 2002; Pestoff, 1991). Pestoff 
(1991) includes four logics in his conceptualization of the co-operative organizational 
structure: the logic of membership; the logic of efficient competition (and the market); 
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the logic of (political) influence; and the logic of personnel management. The logics of 
membership and personnel management comprise the internal environment of the co-
operative; the logics of efficient competition and influence are part of the external 
environment (Pestoff, 1991). A co-operative is developed through the balancing of the 
four logics; if there is an emphasis on just one then a co-operative is transformed into a 
different kind of organization (Pestoff, 1991). The focus of this study is on the logic of 
membership and the logic of competition.  
 Butler (1988) offers a useful conceptualization of the structure of co-operatives in 
comparison to corporations (Figure 1) and highlights the internal tension between the 
logic of co-operation and the logic of bureaucracy. The operational structure on the right 
hand side of the figure depicts a simplified view of a corporation. As the business grows, 
the complexity of the structure increases as it expands horizontally with more 
departments and greater specialization. Along with horizontal expansion, the business 
develops vertically to better coordinate the departments.  The operations structure is 
guided by the bureaucratic logic where decisions are predominantly made from the top 
down.  
 For co-operatives, an additional membership structure (as shown on the left-hand 
side) is added. It is here where member control originates. In contrast to the operations 
structure, the membership structure is typically more heterarchical in its decision-
making. This presents an internal tension or ‘institutional friction’ as what emerges is 
democratic decision-making in a capitalist economic form (Mooney, 2004). The co-
operative logic emphasizes local responses, participation and decentralized decision-
making whereas the bureaucratic logic is about efficiencies, hierarchies, and top-down 
decision-making (Torgerson, Reynolds & Gray, 1997). Some scholars have argued that 
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in a competitive business environment it is the co-operative logic that most often 
succumbs to the logic of bureaucracy and the market (Craig, 1993; Laycock, 1989; 
Torgerson, Reynolds & Gray, 1997). 
Figure 1: The Co-operative Structure 
Operational personnel 
Vertical 
flows Management 
Staff 
Horizontal 
flows 
General Manager 
Vertical 
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Directors
Members
Delegates
Membership Structure Operations structure 
(Butler, 1988)
 
 Although co-operatives have developed their operations structure to meet the 
changing environment (i.e. improved information flows both horizontally and vertically, 
employed specialists, and standardized reporting and procedures), membership structure 
development has lagged behind (Butler, 1988). Pestoff (1991) found in his studies on 
Swedish co-operatives that the amalgamations were economically motivated and did not 
consider the impacts restructuring would have on democratic structures.  
 Other scholars have observed the paucity of innovation in the membership 
structures of co-operatives. Ostergaard and Halsey, (1965) noted, “a lack of 
experimental temper” towards co-operative governance in the British Co-operative 
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Society in the 1960’s. Even with “deplorable” turnouts to member meetings the structure 
of the co-operatives was never questioned and the solution became one of understanding 
why members did not participate (Ostergaard & Halsey, 1965).  Fairbairn (1989: 176) 
also questions why co-operatives in Western Canada have not developed more 
“elaborate democratic structures” adding that most were still dependent on one annual 
meeting for voting and to convey information to members. Both Pestoff (1991) and 
Butler (1988) suggest that member control can be improved with an emphasis on a 
greater sophistication in membership structures of which more will be discussed below.  
2.5.3 Size  
 
 External drivers and the internalization of conventional management thinking have 
prompted co-operatives to grow themselves in terms of membership numbers and 
geographic scale. How larger co-ops can operate effectively is a central issue in co-
operative research. The tensions between the two logics of membership and competition, 
or the logics of co-operation and bureaucracy, are intensified when co-operatives 
increase in scale. An increase in size has been found to reduce member participation in 
some instances (Pestoff, 1991). Size can add to the complexity of decision-making, and 
the resulting tendencies to push key decisions to higher levels in the organization and 
away from members (Mooney and Gray, 2002 & Pestoff, 1991).  With more members, 
there is the strong tendency for co-ops to move away from participatory democracy to a 
representative democracy (Pestoff, 1991; Utterstrom, 1974 cited in Schomisch and 
Mirowsky, 1981). In larger co-operatives with more members there is a greater 
likelihood that members will have more diverse needs (Fulton & Gibbings, 2000). There 
is also increased risk that members may lose sight of the goals of the overall 
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organization (Schomisch & Mirowsky, 1981). All of these changes are interrelated. 
Three of these ― member heterogeneity, participation, and control will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
2.5.3.1 Member Heterogeneity 
One of the potential outcomes of co-operative amalgamations is that a more 
diverse membership will need to be accommodated within one larger organization. 
Diversity in membership can be a strength, but may also constitute another of the 
internal tensions within co-ops. As local co-op stores merge and form larger co-
operatives, the needs of member-users (and user non-members) may become more 
disparate. Member heterogeneity and its impact on co-operative enterprises, and in 
particular decision-making, has been an area of much interest in co-operative research 
(Bijman, 2005; Fulton, 1999; Gripsrud, Lenvik & Olsen, 2000; Iliopoulos & Cook, 
1999; Reynolds, 1997). It is frequently argued that because members are the owners, 
decision makers, and users of a co-operative it is their needs that should and must drive 
the operations. When members needs become more disparate, decision-making is 
disrupted and the co-operative may become plagued with inefficiencies. Bijman (2005) 
summarizes some of the potential obstacles that co-operatives may face: 
Decision-making may become more laborious, coordination between member 
firms and the co-operative firm may become more difficult, member 
commitment may decrease and member willingness to provide equity capital 
may be reduced. In sum, the membership heterogeneity affects the efficiency of 
the co-operative organization.  
 
 A heterogeneous membership may also create an “add-on mentality” within the 
co-operative (Hogeland, 2003). Members press for services that suit their needs and if 
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the co-op accommodates them it will mean adding on more services. The increasing 
number of services that a co-op provides may eventually exceed its managerial 
capabilities. Hogeland (2003) argues that this mentality has contributed to the demise of 
some of the larger agricultural co-operatives in the United States.     
 Most of the intellectual effort has focused on agricultural producers and their co-
operatives. Despite research describing the increasingly disparate demands of consumers 
in North America (Zafiriou, 2005), few studies have looked at issues surrounding 
member heterogeneity in consumer co-operatives. Rural consumer co-operatives deal 
with many of the same aspects and sources of heterogeneity. They may serve a dispersed 
membership, with significant differences in terms of purchase volumes, place of 
employment (rural/urban), as well as divergent business objectives. This is in addition to 
differences based on age, educational level, lifestyle and philosophies of production and 
consumption. Other possible sources of diversity include temporal dimensions such as 
when a member joined and the intensity or scope of member engagement with a co-
operative (Gertler, 2004a).  
 A second absence in the academic work is the impact of the heterogeneity of 
communities, not just individual members. Mooney and Gray (2002) assert that the 
neoclassical models of co-operatives fail to include the interests of community in their 
analysis. Larger co-operatives inevitably expand into more communities that differ in 
socioeconomic characteristics, size, values and socio-historic conditions. Additionally, 
some communities might have been, or still are, bitter rivals.   Co-operatives also differ 
from one community to the next as one manager contends, “Every co-op has its own 
culture” (Fairbairn, 2003a: 177). Stores can differ if they are urban or rural; large or 
small; or diversified or specialized in their products (Fairbairn, 2003a: 177).  
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 Further, Fulton and Hammond Ketilson (1992) suggest that co-operatives react 
differently depending on the size of the community in which they operate. Co-ops in 
larger communities must deal with large competitors while stores in medium-sized 
centers may seek to avoid forcing other businesses out of the local market; in the 
smallest communities the co-op may not have any direct competition (although 
competition likely originates from outside the community). Additionally, in smaller 
communities the co-operative frequently plays a more central role in both the economic 
activity and the cohesiveness of the community (Fulton & Hammond Ketilson, 1992).  
 While many have maintained that heterogeneity is a problem for co-operatives, 
other scholars have argued that co-operatives can and should use this diversity to their 
advantage. Fairbairn (2003b: 17) states, “Co-operatives need to resist an understandable 
tendency to homogenize their memberships, to ignore or downplay difference.” For 
Mooney (2004) the goal should not be to remove or eliminate tensions but to create 
opportunities for dialogue. He states, “Rather than a utopian vision of an ultimate end to 
struggle between social groups, what is needed are mechanisms and institutions that 
permit the sustainability of struggle in legitimate institutions” (2004: 77). To engage 
diverse members, co-operatives may need to think of new forms of membership 
(Gertler, 2004a). 
2.5.3.2  Member Participation 
 Co-operatives offer their members several ways to participate. Ostergaard and 
Halsey (1965) use three measures of participation—use of the co-operative (consumer 
loyalty), attendance at meetings and voting in elections. A fourth measure that could be 
included is running for positions in the co-operative.  
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 As co-operatives grow, member participation may become more of a challenge as 
numbers and geographical size make it more difficult for all members to be involved. 
Studies of voluntary organizations (Warner & Hilander, 1964) and co-operatives 
(Pestoff, 1991) have shown that a larger size frequently has a negative affect on member 
participation. In contrast, Stoel (2002) found that group size had no influence on group 
identification, communication frequency and relationship effectiveness for retail 
hardware co-operative groups in the US. These retail co-operative groups consist of 
smaller retailers that form a wholesale buying co-operative. Stoel theorizes that it is 
precisely because members are separated geographically and have less interaction that 
growth in size impacts them differently from other groups. Members may still perceive 
their relations to be personal as they only interact with management and a small portion 
of the total membership. In this context, size can become less of a concern for co-
operatives in relation to the benefits of economies of scale. This conclusion supports the 
assertion of some researchers who have argued that the focus of larger co-operatives 
should be the local co-op outlet (Pestoff, 1991). If people feel comfortable at the local 
level they are more willing to participate.  
Butler (1988) contends that the size of agricultural co-operatives may not be a 
problem if careful attention is given to membership structures.  These structures refer to 
the arrangements that co-operatives offer to members to facilitate participation. She 
argues that much of the analysis on member participation has focused on the social-
psychological aspects. She suggests that a new paradigm is needed which not only 
considers the social-psychological reasons for members participation but also takes into 
account the organization’s structure as a vehicle for increasing participation and member 
control. 
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Pestoff (1991) offers a similar argument asserting that structural factors can 
explain the presence or lack of member participation in co-operatives and suggests that 
there are ways to encourage greater participation. He posits that, “Membership activity 
is not merely an expression of individual preferences or predisposition to participate but 
also in part a response by members to the options for participation offered by the 
organization through its structures” (Pestoff, 1991: 63).  Birchall and Simmons (2004) 
argue that larger co-operatives should focus on the “true believers” of the co-operative. 
They are a small subgroup of members who are genuinely interested in the development 
of the co-operative and would be willing to put in the time and effort needed to make the 
co-operative work as a democratic and economic enterprise.  
2.5.3.3 Control  
 For Gray and Butler (1994) co-operative control falls into three categories—
representation, policymaking and oversight. Representation is associated with the 
membership structure while policy-making and oversight constitute control within the 
operations or management environment (Gray & Butler, 1994). The authors argue that a 
larger co-operative will tend to have more difficulty in maintaining a measure of 
member control in policy making and oversight. One reason is that although the 
operational structure increases in scale and complexity, there is generally very little done 
in the way of developing adequate and appropriate membership structures (Butler, 
1988). Board members are frequently asked to provide oversight and implement policy 
on issues beyond their expertise. Boards may feel overwhelmed and pass the majority of 
the decisions off to management. Amalgamations can also swing the locus of decision-
making away from local communities to the central management-dominated 
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organization. Independent decision-making at the level of local co-operative branches or 
societies is restricted as policy is decided at higher levels (Pestoff, 1991).  
 For greater member control, the creation of appropriate horizontal and vertical 
departments or committees could be considered (Gray & Butler, 1994). Gray and Butler 
(1994: 37) suggest, “Oversight and policy-making can be enhanced by using specialized 
committees that deal with single commodities, markets or single aspects of operations 
(e.g. finance, member relations, marketing)”.   
 Dunn (1988) states that there needs to be effective and functional control, “The 
mere existence of control mechanisms is meaningless unless those mechanisms are 
used” (Dunn, 1988: 85). Pestoff (1991: 67) draws a similar conclusion: 
An organization with structures that include a fair share of democratic 
procedures and representative bodies for decision-making may be 
formally democratic. But unless its structure also facilitates 
membership participation, there is not guarantee that this decision-
making process will take the interests of the members into account on 
important issues.  
 
Even where member structures are democratic, if there is no effective connection to the 
operations structure then member participation is a mere formality and decisions will be 
made elsewhere. The mechanisms put in place to assure that members have a say in the 
operations of their co-operative are often found to be inadequate when members attempt 
employ these procedures (Axworthy, 1990).  
2.6 THE CO-OPERATIVE RESPONSE  
 
 As co-operatives have grown, structures have been implemented to preserve at 
least some measure of member participation and control. Local committees and delegate 
structures affiliated with branches of regionally based co-operatives have been 
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introduced into many larger co-operatives (Schomisch & Mirowsky, 1981). Larger co-
operatives tend to develop a delegate system either within a centralized or federated 
structure (Craig, 1976). In centralized co-operatives “individuals are members of the 
central organization but patronize local facilities which are under management of the 
central organization” (Schomisch & Mirowsky, 1981: 9). The membership of a federated 
co-operative is made up of local co-operatives who own and control the second tier co-
operative. Each local co-operative elects representatives to attend annual meetings of the 
federation and these delegates elect a board of directors.  
 The advantage of a federated structure is that it can facilitate unity among the 
locals while retaining local autonomy (DeClercy, 2001). Subsidiarity, which is the 
principle of ensuring that decisions will be made at the local or most immediate level 
wherever possible, guides many federations and contributes to the retention of power 
within the local organizations. Subsidiarity implies that the federation does not dominate 
over local initiative or responsibility, and can help to ensure that undue centralization of 
power does not occur (Développement International Desjardins, 2005).  DeClercy 
(2001) notes that a workable federation entails a sharing of power between the center 
and the locals, maintaining a level of diversity and decentralized initiative within the 
system. An unworkable federation, on the other hand, is one where communication is 
problematic, and too much control either in the center or in the locals.  
  Développement International Desjardins (2005) contends that there is growing 
interest in federated networks in the financial sector. They identify four criteria for 
successful federated networks: shared resources; standardization of operations; 
contractual solidarity; and strategies for internal regulations on governance. Each is 
described briefly below: 
 39
Shared resources:  
 The entities of the federation unite to share information and services they would 
not have access to as individual units. 
Standardization: 
 In federated networks, operational systems (accounting, control systems, etc.), 
policies and norms, and products are standardized. However, the base units decide what 
products are relevant to their members and draw accordingly from a common pool of 
products. 
Contractual solidarity: 
 This refers to the formal agreements between the various entities in the federation 
and may include delegating decision-making power with respect to distribution of 
surpluses, and decisions on outlet locations and size to the apex organization. 
Setting up internal rules and strategies to strengthen governance:  
 The final criterion for a federated network is to ensure that there is a structure for 
democratic representation. They state, “A federated network will centralize many of its 
functions while ensuring ongoing validation of its decisions and orientations by the base 
through consultation mechanisms and effective democracy” (Développement 
International Desjardins, 2005:10). Also, this step involves respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity as discussed above. Développement International Desjardins (2005:10) 
states, “The principle constitutes a safeguard for balancing responsibility and democratic 
representation in order to avoid the abuses of centralization”.  
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2.6.1 Delegates 
 Delegates, as representatives in larger multi-branch and federated co-operatives, 
play a central role in balancing powers and in communicating the needs of members to 
the central body, and the needs of the central body to the co-operative members. 
Delegates are part of an intermediate level structure (between members and directors) in 
co-operative governance and act as the agent for members in decision-making (Reynolds, 
Gray & Kraenzle, 1997). Common functions that delegates typically perform include: 
nominating directors, providing advice to the board, developing policy, and member 
relations and education (Craig, 1976). The number of responsibilities allocated to 
delegates, the length of service of the delegates, and the number of meetings per year 
were found to differ widely among agricultural co-operatives (Craig, 1976). 
 Schomisch and Mirowsky (1976) divide delegate responsibilities into three broad 
categories: 
 (i) Internal maintenance of the organization which includes: electing directors, making 
changes to bylaws; approving changes in services, products or marketing outlets; setting 
policy; approving reports and financial statements.  
(ii) Liaison between members and the board: providing a voice for members regarding 
co-operative performance; being a local source of information for members wanting to 
learn more about the co-operative.  
(iii) Act as an extension of the co-operative in the business environment and advocating 
on behalf of the co-operative to government. 
 While the primary responsibility of delegates is to represent members, some 
scholars have pointed out that in order for a delegate system to operate effectively, total 
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responsibility cannot rest on the delegate. Following the delegate theory of 
representation, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) stress the mutual responsibility of the 
representative and the represented. Representation is weakened where either those who 
are the represented fail to provide feedback about their preferences to the representative 
or where the representative fails to act on behalf of the represented.  
 Agency theory has also been used to describe delegation (Lupia, 2001). The agent 
(the representative) acts on behalf of the principal (the represented). The disparity 
between the interests of the principal and the action taken by the agent is called agency 
loss. Loss is minimized if the principal and agent share common interests and if the 
principle is knowledgeable about the agent’s activities (Lupia, 2001). Here again, the 
emphasis is on the need for both the represented and the representative to be fully 
informed. The issue of size is relevant as it may be more difficult for members to have 
knowledge and information about each other in larger co-operatives (International Joint 
Project on Co-operative Democracy, 1995). 
 Representation through delegates can potentially create multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting, identities for those members elected to represent the locals (DeClercy, 2001). 
Although elected by their local co-operative, in their decision-making these 
representatives may be increasingly expected to take into account—and even to focus 
primarily on—the needs of the entire organization. They may also be under pressure to 
view the co-operative from the perspective of the managers at the top of the second tier 
co-operative enterprise.  A key issue in the structure of decision-making is for these 
delegates to find a balance between their two identities as representatives of local (retail) 
co-operatives, and as a central member body focused on the needs and interests of the 
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larger firm (e.g. a co-operative wholesaler) with many individual co-operative 
stakeholders (DeClercy, 2001).  
2.7   DELEGATES AND COMMITTEES IN PRACTICE 
 
 In England, as early as the 1950’s co-operative societies were implementing 
measures to deal with the emerging challenge of expanding without sacrificing 
democratic control. One method was creating local committees that operated within 
larger societies. Ostergaard and Halsey (1965) describe the establishment and operations 
of the local committee of the Peterborough and District Society located north of London. 
It had become a regional co-operative when the co-operative society in the city 
amalgamated with co-operatives in several smaller towns and villages. In 1958, the 
entire co-operative society encompassed an area of 2,200 square miles and had 76,000 
members. The area was predominantly rural with nearly half of the members living 
outside of Peterborough. To maintain the interest of these smaller centers, and to 
facilitate democratic participation, the Society established local committees in each of 
the eight branches. Four members were elected to the committees and one of the 
committee members was required to attend bi-annual meetings in Peterborough.  At the 
local level, the committee met once a week with the branch manager to discuss sales 
reports. The committees however did not see themselves as supervisors to management 
nor were they relaying the complaints of members to the board, mostly because such 
input was a rarity. Some local committees developed into another mechanism through 
which local managers could bring pressure to bear on the board on specific matters.   
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 Ostergaard and Halsey (1965:66) state that the most successful local committees 
were the ones that were given some level of authority: 
From general experience it appears to be true that advice and consultation do not 
provide an adequate basis for viable organs of government. To be in a position to 
give advice is not very satisfactory unless one is assured that the advice given 
will, in most cases at least, be taken. And if that assurance is made, then the 
advisory body becomes virtually a controlling body and an organ of 
government.    
 
Of the successful societies that Ostergaard and Halsey (1965) studied―the West 
Somerset Society―stood out in that there were clear distinctions between the 
responsibilities of the central body and the district bodies. It was also significant that 
district committees enjoyed a level of authority and legitimacy both within their own 
local co-operatives and in the central committee.  
2.8 TRIARCHIES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON CO-OPERATIVES 
 
Much of the co-operative literature has focused the dual logics of co-operatives 
with both heterarchies and hierarchies as part of their structure. Hierarchy is the more 
common organizational form in business and refers to top-down decision-making. 
Heterarchy relates to multiple or dispersed rule or a group with multiple decision-makers 
(Fairtlough, 2005). As co-operatives continue to grow in geographical scale, in business 
volumes and in membership, new relations are emerging to maintain the democratic 
nature of the organization. In federations for example, subsidiarity preserves the local 
autonomy of stores and maintains member participation and control. 
The integration of local autonomy, and heterarchical and hierarchical decision-
making in one organization has been characterized as a triarchy. A triarchy refers to the 
three ways of getting things done in an organization that include hierarchy, heterarchy 
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and responsible autonomy (Fairtlough, 2005). Responsible autonomy exists when a local 
group is given the opportunity to make decisions on their own but is held accountable 
for their actions by the larger organization. “Encapsulation” or the rules and procedures 
that the autonomous units must follow, and “critique” or the ways in which the group is 
evaluated (including auditing and reporting) are important conditions that allow for 
responsible autonomy to work effectively. This is in parallel to what Développement 
International Desjardins (2005) identifies as surveillance or a method for internal 
supervision. It allows a co-operative federation to intervene in a timely manner when 
units are in difficulty. 
Fairtlough describes a growing trend in business to experiment with and adopt 
governance structures that incorporate all three forms of decision-making. Significant 
advantages can accrue when a business becomes less hierarchical and includes the two 
other complementary methods of decision-making.  Co-operatives already integrate 
some heterarchical decision-making in their organizational structures by virtue of the 
fact that members are included in decision-making processes through the principle of 
one-member one-vote. Responsible autonomy may not be a relevant concept in smaller, 
stand-alone co-ops but may be a useful approach in larger co-ops. For example, branches 
within a larger co-operative organization may exercise some independence in day-to-day 
management but nonetheless be responsible for meeting certain targets and for operating 
within a given budget. If targets are not met or if the business declines, local managers 
will be held accountable by higher management.  Federations and the principle of 
subsidiarity, in many ways, encapsulate the idea of responsible autonomy. Decisions are 
made at the lowest appropriate level and only when the lower units are unable to 
perform certain tasks will the higher units intervene. 
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Subsidiarity and responsible autonomy relate closely to what co-operative 
scholars argue is the need for emphasis on the local co-operative branch or outlet.  With 
more attention focused on the local co-operative establishment, members may justifiably 
feel that their participation is more meaningful and worthwhile. By following principles 
of responsible autonomy and subsidiarity, co-operatives may better promote and 
integrate member participation into their regionally structured enterprises.  They may 
also gain from a greater measure of responsible yet flexible and locally adapted 
initiatives from local managers and staff.  
2.9 AREAS OF RESEARCH AND IDENTIFIED GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
The literature review highlights four primary areas of research that serve as the 
basis for this study. Two of the key areas set the context in which the PACA operates. 
Rural and retail restructuring, in large part, explain the motivating factors for co-
operative restructuring. The literature describes the complexities of these two 
overarching and interrelated processes that are occurring in rural Saskatchewan. In 
response, co-operatives have had to reorganize to meet the new and growing challenges 
these changes present.  
A third key focus of the research, delves into some of the typical responses co-
operatives have used to remain viable in the new environment. One of the strategic 
adaptations for both agricultural and retail co-ops is to grow in size to take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope. Following this, the research delves into the implications 
and opportunities that growth presents for co-operatives and what co-ops do to preserve 
the key principles that make them co-ops. One solution for larger co-operatives is to 
introduce delegates into their membership structures. Delegates serve as vital link in the 
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democratic structure of the co-op as distances between members and management 
increase (both literally and organizationally). Because the delegates assume a key role in 
larger regional co-ops such as the PACA, delegation theory is the primary focus of the 
section on co-operative response and adaptation.  
Finally, the fourth key area of the literature review focuses on the discussion of 
federated networks and triarchies. Both topics provide greater insights into the structure 
of the PACA. It will be shown in the following chapters that the PACA shares many of 
the same relationships and characteristics as these two organizational forms. It is hoped 
that further analysis of the principles of federated networks and triarchies will add to the 
understanding of multi-branch and semi-decentralized co-operatives such as the PACA3. 
The literature has provided a good basis for understanding the PACA. However, 
some gaps in the research were identified. First, although much of the literature deals 
with agricultural co-operatives and their particular membership structures, very little of 
the academic research considers retail co-operatives and how they negotiate and work 
through the same challenges. The agricultural co-operative literature is useful but may 
fail to capture the particular nuances that are a part of the food retailing industry. Most 
of the literature that deals with consumer co-operatives is somewhat dated and comes 
predominantly from the UK. Second, little work has been done on community 
heterogeneity and its impact on co-operatives and co-operative membership. As co-ops 
                                                 
3 Robert Dahl’s work in political science on polyarchy and democratic theory provides additional 
background. He is especially interested in democratic participation in large, pluralistic societies. For an 
overview of Dahl's theories, see Bailey and Braybrooke (2003). To study relationships among actors in 
these communities one could also use network analysis. For a discussion on social networks, see Tindall 
and Wellman (2001). 
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become more regional, community differences will have a greater influence on how the 
co-operative operates.  
Finally, no literature that I am aware of analyzes the regional co-operative structure 
using triarchy theory and conversely, no scholar in triarchics has yet to study co-
operatives. It is surprising that although Fairtlough (2005: 79) contends there is  “mass 
evidence” that organizations will move away from hierarchical structures in the twenty-
first century, no mention is made of co-operatives as being a potential option for 
reorganization, despite the fact that co-ops already employ hierarchies and heterarchies 
in their decision-making.    
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 Chapter 3  STUDY AREA 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The theoretical and practical considerations outlined in the previous chapter are 
relevant to the study of the Prince Albert Co-operative Association (PACA). Co-
operatives in this northern and central prairie region continue to be affected by the 
ongoing changes in the economy and social life of rural areas and by restructuring 
within the retail sector. Olfert and Stabler`s (2000) investigation into the evolution of the 
retail sector in Saskatchewan reveals the significance of retail reorganization over the 
past fifty years.  The shift in service outlets from small towns to urban centers has been 
unrelenting. As a result of downgrading, the number of communities designated as 
minimum convenience centers nearly doubled from 1961 to 2001 (with an analogous 
drop in the number of mid-level centers) (Refer back to Table 1). With the overall 
number of communities remaining constant the numbers suggest that, for the most part, 
the majority of higher-level services are now only concentrated in ten major centers 
across the province. Most of the communities that are a part of this research fall into the 
lower order centres (either minimum or full convenience), and in some cases, co-ops are 
providing the last remaining retail services4.  
The trends towards retail service and population concentration in urban centers 
has, in part, led the Co-operative Retailing System (CRS) in Western Canada to consider 
new initiatives to improve retail viability in rural areas.  The CRS consists of Federated 
                                                 
4 Note that La Ronge and Air Ronge were not included in Stabler and Olfert’s (2002a) classification.  
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Cooperatives Limited (FCL), a wholesale and distribution co-operative and its 275 
member-owner retail co-ops located across Western Canada. In recent years, the CRS 
has emphasized the need for co-operative retailers to consider regionalization, 
consolidations and restructuring operations under a strategy of “area development” 
(Fairbairn, 1989, 2003a). The strategy pursues efficiencies in the co-operative retailing 
system by encouraging amalgamations and centralization of services among co-ops in 
neighboring communities. However, unlike most businesses that make merger decisions 
from head office, decisions within the CRS are the prerogative of individual co-ops. This 
“voluntary regionalization” has been a relatively slow process (Fairbairn, 2003a). Co-op 
members are often reluctant to consider amalgamations on the chance they lose what has 
become a core institution in the community. In light of this, alternatives to mergers are 
being sought to keep co-operatives in communities while at the same time recognizing 
that changes are necessary given the restructuring of rural areas and the retail sector.  
The co-ops that are part of the PACA have obviously decided to amalgamate and 
this chapter looks at the types of co-ops and communities that now make up the PACA. 
It will become apparent that the region in which the PACA operates is diverse. The 
communities and the co-ops cannot be easily categorized under common themes—they 
are not strictly agriculture; not all are growing, nor are they all in decline; and the 
services provided vary throughout the region. It is this diversity that makes the PACA an 
interesting study.   
3.2 PRINCE ALBERT AND REGION 
Between the late 1950’s and 2001, the Prince Albert Co-operative Association 
(PACA) amalgamated with, or established, a number of co-ops in the surrounding region. 
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As of the middle of 2007, it had branches in nine other smaller communities in an area 
spanning approximately 300km north to south and 250km east to west.  
Figure 2: Map Showing the Location of the PACA Co-op Branches and the Functional 
Classifications of the Communities.  
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The diversity of these communities is pronounced, each with particular historical 
and socio-economic origins. The region includes the urban and urban fringe areas of 
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Prince Albert and surrounding rural municipalities; the mostly agriculture-dependent 
communities of Domremy, Kinistino, Paddockwood, Shellbrook, Smeaton and Wakaw; 
and the three forest-dependent communities of Big River, Air Ronge and La Ronge. Air 
Ronge and La Ronge could also be classified as Northern Native areas. Some of the 
towns also fall into the category of tourist, resort or recreational communities including 
Big River, La Ronge, and Wakaw due to their proximity to lakes. 
Prince Albert is the third largest city in Saskatchewan with a population of 
34,138 in 2006 and has the highest percentage of Aboriginal people of any city in the 
province at 30 percent. Despite a slight decrease in population between 1996 and 2006, 
Prince Albert has grown by nine percent since 1986. This contrasts with many other 
moderately large communities in the North including Tisdale, Melfort and Nipawin, 
which saw declines in population over the same period (Sask Trends Monitor, 2004).  
Situated north of Prince Albert is Air Ronge, which is the only study community 
to experience an increase in population over the past 10 years (Saskatchewan Bureau of 
Statistics, 2007). Both Air Ronge and the neighboring town of La Ronge are 
predominantly Aboriginal communities with local economies strongly based on the 
forestry and tourist industries. This region, labeled by some as part of the “Far North”, is 
also highly dependent on government transfers and public sector employment (Sask 
Trends Monitor, 2004).  
In contrast to the growing population in the north are the population losses 
experienced in the seven more southern communities. The largest changes have occurred 
in the agriculture-dependent areas of Domremy, Smeaton and Paddockwood. Domremy 
and Paddockwood have the smallest populations of all the branch communities at 124 
and 125 respectively.  Domremy had the largest population drop over the last decade at 
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33 percent (See Table 2). Both Domremy and Paddockwood are identified as Strong 
MIZ communities while Smeaton is classified as moderate (See Table 3). 
Kinistino, Wakaw, Big River and Shellbrook are somewhat larger communities 
with populations ranging from 643 in Kinistino to 1215 in Shellbrook. All of these 
communities have experienced a small drop in population over the last 10 years (See 
Table 2). Big River, a forest-dependent community, had the largest decline at 11.9 
percent, some of which may be related to the sawmill shutting down in 2006.  All the 
communities are classified as Moderate MIZ except for Kinistino, which is in a Weak 
MIZ (See Table 3).  
Table 2: 1996, 2001 and 2006 Populations and Percent Change (1996-2006) of Prince 
Albert and PACA Branch Communities  
 
Year Year Year Percent change Community 
1996 2001 2006 1996-2006 
Paddockwood 187 171 125 -33.2 
Domremy 156 135 124 -20.5 
Big River 826 741 728 -11.9 
La Ronge 2964 2727 2725 -8.0 
Kinistino 691 702 643 -6.9 
Smeaton 192 178 183 -4.7 
Shellbrook 1234 1276 1215 -1.5 
Wakaw 869 884 864 -0.6 
Air Ronge 957 955 1032 +7.8 
Prince Albert 34,777 34,291 34,138 -1.8 
(Statistics Canada, 2006) 
Differentiation among these communities also exists in terms of their proximity 
to Prince Albert. Paddockwood, Domremy and Shellbrook are 30 minutes by automobile 
outside of Prince Albert; Wakaw, Smeaton and Kinistino all are approximately a 45-
minute drive from the larger centre; Big River is one and a half hours away; and Air 
Ronge and La Ronge are two and a half hours north of Prince Albert.  
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The direct relation between population and services of all kinds is evident as 
these communities struggle to maintain public institutions and commercial 
establishments. All the communities are classified into the lowest levels of the central 
place hierarchy (See Figure 2). As minimum convenience or full convenience centers, 
these communities provide only basic services. All but Shellbrook and Big River are 
minimum convenience centers meaning that the majority of people in the area must 
travel to Prince Albert to obtain high order services.   
Table 3: MIZ and Southcott (2003) Classifications for PACA Branch Communities  
 
Typology 
Community 
MIZ Southcott 
Paddockwood Strong Ag-dependent 
Domremy Strong Ag-dependent 
Kinistino Moderate Ag-dependent 
Wakaw Moderate Ag-dependent 
Shellbrook Moderate Ag-dependent 
Smeaton Moderate Ag/Forestry-dependent 
Big River Moderate Forest-dependent 
Air Ronge Weak Forestry/Mining-dependent & Northern Native 
La Ronge Weak Forestry/Mining-dependent & Northern Native 
(Adapted from Statistics Canada (2006) and Southcott, (2003)) 
 
3.3 THE PACA 
The development of the PACA has been a gradual process. Paddockwood was the 
first co-op to become a branch in 1959. It had operated as an independent co-op since 
1929. Wakaw, Domremy and Smeaton became branches in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s and all had been independent co-ops. La Ronge Co-op joined in 1978. The only 
co-ops not to have operated independently before joining the PACA were Air Ronge and 
Big River. Prince Albert Co-op established the branch in Air Ronge when it constructed 
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a convenience store, gas bar and cardlock gas station. In Big River, the co-op bought out 
a privately owned lumberyard, which the co-op continues to operate. A grocery store 
was added later. The last branch to join was Kinistino. Its co-op store was established in 
1939 and merged with the PACA in 2000. During the time of writing, two more co-ops 
in Marcelin and Canwood merged with the PACA increasing the number of branches to 
eleven.  
In 2006, the Prince Albert Co-op had annual sales of $114 million and assets of 
$57 million. The nine branches account for fifty-three percent of the total sales. The 
association employs approximately 400 people and has 21,800 members. The Prince 
Albert Co-op in PA operates a large store providing groceries, electronics, hardware, 
pharmaceuticals and furniture. Throughout the city the co-op also operates consumer 
and card-lock petroleum services, a home and agro centre and a number of car washes. 
Most branches provide food, petroleum and hardware (Prince Albert Co-operative 
Association, 2007).  
 
Economic Environment 
The largest employer in Prince Albert is government, which includes education, 
social services, health and federal penitentiaries. The largest public sector employer in 
2001 was the school division, which employed 800 people; the Health District had 
approximately 500 employees (SaskBiz, 2004). The largest private employer was 
Weyerhaeuser, which had over 800 employees until it closed its pulp and paper mill in 
April of 2006. Northern Lights Casino, which is owned and operated by the Prince 
Albert Grand Council, is the second largest employer with 400 staff members. Prince 
Albert has relatively few employers compared to other cities in the province. In 2006, 
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there were just over 1100 employers in the city and just 26 had more than 100 
employees; almost half of the employers had fewer than four employees (Sask Trends 
Monitor, 2006).  
Retail trade is the industry with the largest number of employers with 229, 
accounting for one fifth of the total employers in the city. The big-box stores are a huge 
draw for PA residents and out-of-town shoppers, particularly shoppers from northern 
communities (City of Prince Albert, 2003). Wal-Mart is the most obvious and was most 
discussed one-stop shopping facility among interviewees. In addition to Wal-Mart, the 
PA Co-op’s major competitors include Superstore, Sobeys, Safeway, IGA, and the Real 
Canadian Wholesale Club. Of these, Superstore is the largest employer with 250 
employees in 2001 (Saskbiz, 2004). The PA Co-op was second with 177 employees 
(excluding branch employees). Other stores that offer some competition in food retailing 
include Shoppers Drug Mart, Zellers, Giant Tiger and M&M Meat Shop—none of 
which are locally-owned businesses. Canadian Tire, Rona and Home Hardware were 
mentioned as the major competitors for the co-op in hardware and home building 
supplies.  In the petroleum industry, the co-op competes with Shell, Imperial Oil, Petro-
Canada, and Husky.  
The influence of the large retail stores located in Prince Albert was felt in all of 
the branches. Delegates and managers saw these box stores as the co-op branches’ 
largest competitors as well. There is relatively little competition for the co-ops within 
the smaller communities, however. For the minimum convenience centers of Domremy, 
Kinistino, Paddockwood, and Smeaton, the co-op store is the only retailer in the 
community. Each co-op branch operates a small grocery store and gas station, and may 
also provide additional services in particular communities. The Kinistino branch, for 
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example, also runs an agro centre that stocks feed, farm supplies and chemicals. The 
Paddockwood co-op branch operates the post office and sells liquor. The only co-op 
branch that has retail competitors is La Ronge. There the large new PACA store shares 
the market with four other grocery stores including North Mart, Robertson Trading Ltd., 
Food Town, and a store on the reserve.  The presence of four stores in the community 
reflects the size of the local and regional population served, the longer distance to Prince 
Albert, and the fact that these stores also cater to the mining companies and outfitters in 
the region. Shellbrook is the only community that does not have a co-op grocery store. 
The co-op branch there deals primarily in farm supplies, farm chemicals and bulk fuel 
delivery. Shellbrook has two privately owned grocery stores, one of which is a Bigway 
Food Store.  
In most of the branch communities, the largest employers are the school 
divisions and regional health authorities. These communities typically have a school, 
some sort of health facility, and a residential centre for seniors. At the time of writing, 
each of the communities had a credit union offering financial services, a hotel and 
restaurant, and a few other small local businesses. Smeaton, for example, has an 
elementary school with classes from K-6 (slated for closure in 2008), a recreation 
facility and a health centre. In addition to the co-op grocery store and gas bar, other 
businesses include a hotel and restaurant, a credit union, a craft shop and an insurance 
agency.  
The number of services in these minimum convenience centers is contrasted with 
the full convenience centers. Shellbrook has over fifty merchants including two grocery 
stores, three department stores, five restaurants, a hotel and bar, a business offering 
computer sales and repair, a flower shop, a clothing store, a travel agency, three gas 
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stations, a lumber yard, etc. The largest employers are the Parkland School Division and 
the Parkland Health Region with 150 and 129 employees respectively. Shellbrook also 
has two fairly large car dealerships which together employ close to 30 people. For 
community facilities, the town has a skating rink, curling rink, golf course, swimming 
pool, sports grounds, senior’s centre and library (Prince Albert REDA, 2005).  
3.3.1 Membership Structure  
 
The PACA has a centralized control structure, which has been defined elsewhere 
as, “individuals are members of the central organization but patronize local facilities 
which are under management of the central organization” (Schomisch & Mirowsky, 
1981: 9). Upon joining a local co-operative branch, members are considered part of the 
PACA and their membership number is good for all the co-op stores that belong to the 
PACA. As result, branches no longer keep records of the number of members or 
patronage allocation. Most centralized co-operatives do not have local annual meetings 
for members (Cropp & Ingalsbe, 1989). In the case of the PACA, local annual meetings 
are held in which local members may participate. However, only delegates of local co-
ops participate in the annual meeting in Prince Albert.  
Members of branch co-operatives elect six members to a local committee. The 
committee members meet with the operations manager and the local branch manager at a 
local branch meeting. The operations manager oversees all of the branches of the PACA 
and is based in Prince Albert; the local branch managers run the local retail store or gas 
bar on a day-to-day basis. Three of the local committee members are selected as 
delegates and attend meetings with delegates from Prince Albert and the eight branches. 
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From among the delegate body, the board of directors and president are elected (See 
Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Prince Albert Co-operative Association (PACA) Membership Structure 
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3.3.1.1 Local Committee 
Local committees meet on average two or three times a year. One of the 
meetings is designated as the annual meeting where local branch members are invited to 
attend. Some of the PACA Board of Directors and the General Manager usually attend 
as well. Although one delegate from a smaller branch reported they could have as many 
as twenty people at an annual meeting, typically branch annual meetings are not well 
attended. It is not unusual for only the six committee members and a few staff to be in 
attendance.  
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The agenda for the committee meetings is set by the operations manager, who 
travels to each of the branches to report on the entire enterprise and the operations of the 
local branch. Information from the operations manager consists of a detailed financial 
report on the grocery store, hardware, bulk petroleum sales, etc. Members get an overall 
picture of how the regional co-operative is functioning and learn about some of the main 
activities that have occurred in each of the branches. Local concerns, including topics 
such as staffing problems and complaints about the store and pricing, are brought up by 
the committee and discussed with the operations manager. 
3.3.1.2 Delegates 
Using Craig’s comparative framework, the PACA delegate system could be 
considered (on paper at least) a “complete control structure”. Craig (1976:10) defines 
such a structure as “delegates are elected to a term of office and are expected to carry out 
functions several times during the year”. This is in contrast to the incomplete structure, 
where delegates meet only once a year (or not at all) and their only function is to elect 
the board of directors and listen to reports. In practice, the PACA appears to have a 
delegate system that falls somewhere between Craig’s two types of control structures. 
Although delegates meet several times a year, many of them feel that their role is just to 
listen to reports and elect the board. Delegates are elected to a three-year term and attend 
two regional meetings a year in Prince Albert. These delegate body meetings are held on 
Saturdays to accommodate those who have a long distance to travel. Delegates are 
reimbursed for their time and travels.  
At the delegate body meeting, one delegate from each of the branches presents a 
report on their local branch, at which time they will bring up questions or concerns not 
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fully dealt with at the local committee meetings. Most of the delegates interviewed said 
they had presented their branch’s report and had brought up member concerns during the 
meeting.  
 
The PACA Delegate Body 
The delegates that were interviewed were asked to characterize the delegate body 
as a whole. Most of the delegates were approximately 40 to 50 years of age, with the 
youngest being in her 30’s and the oldest being 70 to 75 years old. All of the current 
delegates were “white”, with almost an even representation of men and women. The 
longest-serving delegates had begun in the mid 1970’s; the newest delegates had started 
their term in 2007 and had served for less than one year at the time of writing. The 
average time served as a delegate was approximately nine years. Approximately half of 
those interviewed said they were retired and those working were predominantly farmers. 
The majority of interviewees were longtime members of their communities, and also 
longtime members of the local co-op and credit union. A few stated they had been co-op 
members for over fifty years and two were former employees of the co-operative.  
Interviewees agreed that the delegate body meetings consistently had a good 
turnout with anywhere from 30 to all 39 delegates in attendance. Committee meetings 
were also well attended by the delegates, suggesting that the delegates saw participation 
in these regional and local meetings as part of their responsibility. It may be that most of 
the delegates enjoyed being involved in community activities; most of the interviewees 
were quite active in their communities, participating in community events and sitting on 
various boards. One member said she sat on about four different boards in her 
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community and believed that most of the delegates from the other communities probably 
did the same.  
3.3.1.3 Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is elected directly from the delegate body. 
Responsibilities include hiring the general manager, and setting policies for the co-
operative. Board members make up any of the ad hoc committees. Current and previous 
board members who were interviewed stated that the board makes a point of not 
interfering with the day-to-day operations of the co-op.  Time commitments for the 
board include attending delegate body meetings and board meetings. The PACA also 
encourages all of its board members to attend at least some of the local committee 
meetings throughout the region. Board members may also be selected to represent the 
PACA at FCL meetings. The PACA is now one of the largest member-owners of FCL 
and sends five delegates to the FCL annual meeting.  
The PACA does not designate a given number of seats for delegates from PA or 
any of the branches. Although there is the potential that the board could be made up 
entirely of branch delegates, there appears to be some attempt to have representation 
from the Prince Albert Co-op, as it is the central and largest co-op in the PACA. 
Currently the President is from Shellbrook, the Vice President from Candle Lake (PA), 
and the Secretary is from PA. The other board members are from Wakaw, Paddockwood 
and Domremy. There have been no delegates from La Ronge/Air Ronge on the board to 
date. Many of the respondents suggested that the travel time required to attend additional 
board meetings in Prince Albert was the primary reason why no delegate from these two 
committees has sat on the board. 
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3.4 SUMMARY  
 
The region in which the PACA operates is diverse. The key industries in the area 
include agriculture, forestry, mining and tourism. While most of the communities are 
agricultural-dependent, towns such as Big River and the northern communities of Air 
Ronge and La Ronge are predominantly forestry and tourism-dependent. These 
communities do not share the same socio-historic conditions or the same trajectories. 
Further, the PACA branch communities vary in size from a few hundred people to a few 
thousand, which has an impact on branch development. As revealed in the next chapter 
it is the smaller communities that are having the most difficult time hiring qualified 
managers. The MIZ and functional classifications reveal that branch development is also 
influenced by the proximity to Prince Albert. It is not surprising that the smaller co-op 
branches are in close proximity to Prince Albert and in communities that are classified in 
the lowest order of the central-place hierarchy. The more active and prosperous co-op 
outlets are in locations such as La Ronge that are only moderately or weakly influenced 
by Prince Albert.  
The PACA has grown to be one of the largest co-op retailers in Saskatchewan. It 
now has eleven branches that cover a substantial area in the northern part of the province. 
The membership structure of the PACA with local committees, delegates, and board of 
directors was developed to ensure that each branch is represented at the meetings in 
Prince Albert and looks to preserve in some way the democratic nature of the co-op.  
The development of the PACA and its membership structure will be analyzed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.  The analysis takes a closer look at the diversity of the 
northern prairie region and its potential impact on the PACA. The chapter considers the 
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size of the regional co-op and asks whether delegates perceive this to be a concern. 
Other questions investigated center on the membership structure and the delegate system 
of the PACA.   
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 Chapter 4 ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Building from a critical realist perspective, this chapter looks at the Prince Albert 
Co-operative Association (PACA) in an open system—itself an outcome of 
interconnected generative mechanisms—and studies the unique relationships that 
emerge in a regional structure. Questions explored in the research first deal with the 
environmental context and motivating factors that lead to co-op amalgamations. What do 
the delegates see as the primary reasons behind their local co-operative amalgamating 
with Prince Albert? Are the reasons consistent with the literature on rural and retail 
restructuring? The second area of interest is the co-operative structure with particular 
emphasis on the relationships. What type of relationship has developed between 
delegates and branch members? What is the relationship between delegates and the 
regional structure (i.e. What roles do the delegates see themselves playing and what 
roles do managers perceive)?  Another important relationship is the one between the 
branches and the larger central co-operative in Prince Albert. The analysis is also 
designed to reveal the degree to which the relationships between the branches and the 
central (hub) co-op in this network share characteristics and principles with other 
examples of federated networks and with other types of triarchies.  
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4.2 MOTIVATIONS BEHIND AMALGAMATIONS  
Interviewees were asked their opinions regarding the motivations behind the 
regionalization of the co-operative. Most of the delegates and management understood 
the transition to be an adaptation to the particular context in which the co-operative is 
operating. The motivations that respondents cited were decidedly business oriented. If 
there were any other possible reasons for amalgamating, these were not apparent to, or 
were not brought up by, the participants. The primary explanation given for the 
amalgamations was the circumstances surrounding small town retailing. However, it was 
not necessarily economic difficulties that induced smaller co-ops to join Prince Albert as 
one might expect. The majority of branches within the PACA, and those co-operatives in 
the process of amalgamating, were not in any serious financial crisis. In fact, as stand-
alone co-operatives, some were relatively prosperous. The central problem, as illustrated 
by the following remarks, was in finding qualified management. One board member 
stated:  
All of the amalgamations that I have known since I have been on the board, the co-
ops have all been profitable and the reason they have approached us is they are 
having a tremendously difficult time finding managers.  
 
A former board member also noted: 
 
… The biggest problem they have in smaller co-ops is they are changing managers 
all the time so the direction they are going is never in the same direction for any 
length of time. I know with Kinistino when they first came to us… they had [gone] 
through five managers in ten years. [It was] really hard on the Board of Directors 
because they were always looking for a manager.  
 
The co-operatives at Canwood and Marcelin, which voted to amalgamate with 
the PACA in 2007, faced a similar dilemma. Marcelin, for example, had been looking to 
hire a new manager over a period of six to eight months. An informant from the Pioneer 
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Co-op in Swift Current noted that management challenges were a catalyst for co-
operative mergers in Southwestern Saskatchewan as well, though the issue of 
competition (including competition from Pioneer itself) was also mentioned.  
The PACA interviewees saw that a larger co-operative could attract more skilled 
and experienced managers. One informant said that attracting young skilled managers to 
rural Saskatchewan was nearly impossible, as they tend to concentrate in larger centers 
for entertainment and socializing. However, the opportunity to work with a large co-op 
retailer is reason enough for some qualified people to relocate, given that there is the 
prospect of gaining experience and moving up within the organization. Younger 
managers looking for experience and opportunities for promotion within the system are 
more willing to start out in a branch as opposed to a small stand-alone co-op. In this 
context, branches become the training grounds for new managers.  
Nonetheless, amalgamations have not been a panacea for staffing. Currently in 
the PACA, two branches employ a staff person who is placed in a supervisory position 
rather than the co-op hiring a manager. The two most recent additions (Marcelin and 
Canwood) will also employ a staff member to perform some of the tasks of a manager. 
The larger regional structure of the PACA, which employs an operations manager, (a 
second operations managers will be hired in 2008) permits this type of arrangement. The 
operations manager offers more support to those co-operatives in need of assistance. 
Interestingly, although finding qualified managers was identified as one of the major 
obstacles for co-ops, only one of the respondents (and this was only after being asked 
directly) suggested that an expanded region with more members would also improve the 
likelihood of finding qualified board members. An argument could be made that boards 
may also improve in ability as co-ops increase in size. 
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Respondents noted other inducements for amalgamations including: bulk 
purchasing, economies of scale, larger capital investments, elimination of redundancies, 
and reduced competition between PA and smaller co-ops. One manager stated: 
… If you are a small location and you need to replace a truck or a bulk tank or 
something like that you simply can’t afford to do that. … Replacing assets in a small 
community is hard to do so amalgamations make sense... And whether it is 
merchandising, or whether it is training – all those kinds of things [explain] why 
people look at amalgamations. 
  
A former board member said: 
 
[Members] liked the service and the way the co-op operated and so they'd become a 
member of PA Co-op and start buying from us so we'd be overlapping in the same area. 
So we'd say "Hey why are we doing this? We're going into their territory and so why. So 
this is one of the reasons it started happening the way it did. So then we talked to their 
board and everything. It happened in other branches like that too. There was no sense in 
overlapping because it was just costing the co-ops money. 
 
Although there was much discussion of major competitors such as Wal-Mart, 
Superstore, and Rona, only one delegate mentioned competition within the industry as a 
driver behind regionalization: 
In my opinion we have to be as big as possible because the competition is big. I mean 
you can’t have a whole lot of little guys when the trend seems to be going like Wal-Mart. 
There are fewer and fewer outlets and they are getting bigger and bigger… The bigger 
[the co-ops] are like Wal-Mart, the better clout they have for buying power so they can 
pass on a bit of the savings to the consumer…  
 
4.2.1 The Amalgamation Process 
An important consideration in co-operative amalgamations is how the talks 
proceed between the two principal actors.  It is evident that the Prince Albert Co-op, the 
largest co-op in the PACA, is conscientious of not moving in on another cooperative’s 
`territory`. Interview participants pointed out that the Prince Albert Co-op never 
instigated the amalgamations but talks were driven by the smaller co-operatives’ 
concerns over viability in light of finding qualified managers. An invitation from the 
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smaller co-op needs to be extended to the central organization before any negotiation 
begins. 
Some of those interviewed described the amalgamation as a gradual and 
sometimes lengthy process. For many of these rural co-ops it was a type of progression. 
Prince Albert had assumed the bookkeeping or management duties and/or provided 
additional services such as bulk fuel delivery for neighboring co-ops over a number of 
years. These different types of arrangements continued until members of the smaller co-
ops eventually voted to amalgamate with the PACA.   
For both the PACA and Pioneer, consultation between the larger and smaller co-
ops constitutes a major part of the process, as a key concern is making sure that both 
sides are interested in a potential merger. Upfront work involves presentations and 
meetings that in many cases continue over a span of four to five years. After 
consultations and question and answer sessions, a vote is taken in both the larger central 
co-op and the smaller local co-operatives. Managers, at least some of whom have 
received training from FCL, may also play a role in the process. This was the situation 
reported by a PACA manager:  
…If the managers in those locations are doing their job right, probably for the last five 
or six years they have been talking to their board and their members at their annual 
member meetings indicating that it is getting harder and harder to hire qualified staff, to 
replace assets…Through amalgamation you can decrease some of your costs in 
administration and you can hire more qualified staff and people with more experience. 
So if they have done that then [the local co-op] invited us to come out. Our boards first 
met and discussed if there was a mutual interest. We traded information and had a look 
at it and met with the Board again and agreed we are both mutually interested. And then 
we were invited out to their last annual meeting and at that meeting we made a 
presentation comparing side-by-side, different ratios and assets, account receivables and 
dating and all those things so people could compare. And then we did pros and cons. We 
then opened it up for discussions and had a vote on it… At our regular delegates annual 
meeting in Prince Albert—which of course involves all the branches and PA—we did 
the same thing there… We went through the financial information with our delegates 
and the pros and cons and then had a vote. 
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4.2.2 Realized Benefits of Amalgamations 
Given staffing limitations, the smaller co-operatives were, for the most part, 
enthusiastic about joining the PACA, with little resistance coming from the membership. 
Both delegates and management identified added benefits of amalgamation for smaller 
co-operatives including larger patronage refunds, more services, and the sharing of risk.  
The growing size of the PACA was obviously not a major concern for delegates 
given that a larger co-operative could attract qualified managers and be more 
competitive. Most delegates were not opposed to the co-operative expanding even more. 
They thought expansion was a good thing as long as it was done in a controlled manner.  
A number of the members brought up member relations, suggesting that as long as the 
co-op could keep the member contact then it would not be a problem for the 
organization to continue to grow.  
 
Stability 
Delegates talked of the stability of a regional co-operative. One of the prime 
examples of strength at the regional level was the new La Ronge store. The La Ronge Co-
op is one of the larger branches within the PACA and is located  north of Prince Albert. A 
new grocery store was built in 2006 that rivals any store in larger communities. Without 
the support of the PACA, delegates and managers agreed that the grocery store would not 
have been built.  As one manager stated: 
I think some of our strengths actually lie in how we treat people in the outlying areas. 
You know, the people of La Ronge were deeply moved and touched that we built 
such a nice store there and they knew that it wasn’t possible on their own and it was 
the strength of the whole. 
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Branch managers were particularly cognizant of the added benefits of a regionally based 
co-op for providing expertise and support in management. For one branch manager:   
Being a branch and belonging to the PA Co-op and the PA Co-op belonging to 
Federated, we have a lot of resources there. If I run into something here that I’m not 
aware of I can go to PA Co-op or I can go to Federated. There’s expertise there.  
 
Others managers noted that with more branches there more opportunities to share 
resources. Numerous examples were given of sharing that occurred within the region. 
Older products not selling at one location might be needed at another branch. If a truck 
broke down or a driver got sick, one branch covered for the other by sending over trucks 
to deliver fuel. Used equipment such as freezers that were not needed in a larger store 
could be installed in the smaller stores to replace older equipment there. Managers could 
also share the cost of a semi-load of barbwire or fertilizer, which could be purchased at a 
volume discount and distributed to the branches as needed.   
 
Spreading Risk 
A common theme that ran throughout the interviews was the capacity of the 
organization to share risk.  Risk is spread across communities (urban and rural), sectors 
(agriculture, forestry, mining), and products (wholesale and retail). It was found that 
diversity within the PACA region was in no way considered a major obstacle in the 
operations of the co-operative. In fact, many of the interviewees thought that the 
diversity of communities was a positive for the co-operative. Having communities with 
different economies was seen to reduce the risk within the co-operative.  A board 
member stated: 
When agriculture was very bad some years with the droughts and whatever – if that 
part of the business wasn’t doing very well at that time well the logging business was 
doing exceptionally well for us, or tourism in La Ronge was…So being diversified 
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seemed to spread our risk…Agriculture is a little bit stressed this year but they also 
were telling me that at nearly the same time, [the co-op] lumberyards can’t keep up. 
The lumberyard in Prince Albert said that if anybody was to phone and ask for a 
quote on a new house or could we provide lumber for a new house, they said the best 
we could tell them was call us about this time next year. They are sold right out and 
they can’t keep up. They are just running trying to keep up with the house sales. So it 
always seems like being diverse, you know hopefully not everything will go down at 
once. They will kind of offset one another. 
 
Similarly, a manager commented:  
 
Agro is down and sometimes food is up or lumber is doing strong or tourism or 
sawmills are doing well and other years they are not so I think our overall diversity 
helps us in off years in certain commodities.  
 
The diversity of individual member needs in communities throughout the region 
was dealt with or embraced by allowing local variations in service provision and the 
stocking of products. The La Ronge Co-op, for instance, stocks trapping supplies for 
trappers in the area. The store also has a plane that delivers supplies to outfitters in the 
North while co-ops in agricultural areas sold more fertilizers and chemicals. In smaller 
communities the co-operative is expanding into other services. For example, the 
Paddockwood grocery store offers postal services and liquor sales. Having this type of 
flexibility in the types of products that are sold enables branches to meet the demands of 
their particular community. A type of responsible autonomy is evident here, as local 
managers are trusted to supply the products desired by local consumers.  
Additionally, the diversity of products that the co-operative provides (groceries, 
lumber, agro-products etc.) allows smaller communities to maintain access to essential 
goods and services. As one respondent explains: 
Domremy is a good example. Our petroleum does so well that … it would never 
make sense right now to close the store…so we operate that store even though it is a 
very, very small volume and if you were an individual trying to run that business you 
probably couldn’t operate it. But yet we can because we have a good petroleum 
business there. A lot of those members probably shop at Wakaw [Co-op] and we 
appreciate that and a lot of them maybe shop in Prince Albert as well.  
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Further, branches have links to multiple levels of the federated co-operative system and 
these levels can spread out risk across the province and even throughout Western 
Canada.  Managers can also access relevant knowledge and expertise throughout the co-
operative network:  
But the expertise is the big thing where we have got everybody helping everybody 
type of thing and so you are not an island by yourself out there struggling and 
making mistakes and nobody is picking up on it and these types of things. That is the 
huge advantage—the way we are operating versus being a co-op of your own. 
 
 
Part of a Winning Team 
 
Some delegates alluded to the fact that people liked to be on a winning team. The 
PACA has shown itself to be successful, having never closed a branch since the first one 
joined around the 1960’s. Members are excited about becoming larger and possibly 
more successful. The growth the co-operative is experiencing might be one of the few 
positive stories that rural communities are a part of:  
[Branch members] like the idea that the PA Co-op is continuing to grow in that area 
because you always hear of everything being centralized in some businesses where 
they are closing places so this kind of gives them encouragement that we are… 
keeping branches open and expanding in fact. 
 
 
Member Relations 
 
Another reason why co-op members may be receptive to amalgamations is 
because the relation between themselves as consumers and the local branch appears 
relatively unaffected. It is almost a “behind-the-scenes” type of merger where the 
administrative components are rationalized but the more visible components such as 
buildings and staff remain.  
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Even though the PACA as a whole grows in size and membership, branch 
members see few changes in their relations to the central hub in Prince Albert.  Members 
still have access to the board and managers, and their local co-operative continues to 
send three delegates to the regional meetings. What does increase for the smaller co-ops 
are patronage refunds and the number of services available. This seems to support 
Stoel’s (2002) work which suggests that size becomes less of a concern where there are 
tangible benefits from economies of scale. Moreover, local co-ops have benefited from 
the fact that most of the retail services involved are difficult to rationalize. As Berry 
(2006) contends, soft goods such as groceries cannot easily be delivered without a 
physical location, and therefore, the geographic centralization of these kinds of retail 
services may not be as easy as it is in the financial sector.  
4.2.3 Disadvantages of Amalgamating 
 
Interviewees did not have many negative things to say about the regional structure. 
Those that did comment emphasized some of the problems associated with rural 
communities such as feelings of isolation and a focus on urban interests. One branch 
manager commented: 
I suppose like any other larger corporation a weakness could be sometimes that you 
get removed from the local. I don’t feel as a branch we do but I know just dealing 
with PA and Federated sometimes some of the things that come out of there are more 
geared for a large urban centre than it is for the rural, and there is a difference.  
  
A former delegate commented: 
 
I see [being part of the PACA] as a positive thing. However, a little bit stronger 
communication between the board and the delegates and the committee members, I 
feel, would be an asset. We are not far from Prince Albert but on occasion we do feel 
quite isolated. 
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Although amalgamations are perceived to be positive in the long run, members do make 
tradeoffs in the early stages. Members must decide what the benefit is of having a 
locally owned and controlled co-op with its own board if the co-operative does not have 
the wherewithal to meet members’ needs. On the other hand, they may choose to join the 
larger co-operative that has the resources to meet members’ needs but with the 
understanding that these resources are shared throughout the region. Although smaller 
stores were perhaps profitable, it was questionable as to how much capital they had 
available to reinvest in buying fuel trucks or updating the store, for example. The 
following comments from two managers explain the new relations from the perspective 
of a local co-op: 
If [an independent co-op] decided they wanted to get into fertilizer, their local board 
could do that – spend the money and set it up and full speed ahead. Now if you are 
part of the branches it has to become part of the business plan and while they can 
recommend it to senior management and the Board of Directors, that is all it is – it is 
a recommendation to the Board of Directors, and senior management. And then [the 
PACA] would put it in the business plan, do a feasibility and see if it made sense. 
And depending on what resources are available then they would go ahead with it, and 
if the timing is right. 
 
I guess the biggest concern is usually control issues. Because they can’t say that they 
are going to build a new store because it just doesn’t work that way. Now they have 
to depend on Prince Albert to agree with that and to have the money and it should be 
a priority with us… 
 
Another possible tradeoff is in how services are to be delivered:  
We have reduced services in some areas, but we're providing the service maybe in a 
different fashion. For instance, in Smeaton, it just wasn't cost-effective to stock 
chemical in that small place, so we're saying, "We're going to change the way we're 
doing this. We're going to provide you with chemical, but it's going to be provided 
through Prince Albert by truck or whatever". Of course there's all kinds of opposition 
to that, but the end result was that it worked fine. It helped the branch because they're 
not worrying about carrying that inventory or having the specialist on staff and it can 
be serviced from 50 miles away and it worked out great.  
 
Relating to Berry’s (2006) work on service provision, branch members are 
witnessing the centralization of the information, and expertise function of fertilizer 
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provision, as these services can be provided remotely. Also, as Berry (2006) states, hard 
goods are more readily centralized than soft products, as they do not need to be viewed 
before purchase. Although the PACA has maintained a physical location in most of 
these communities for groceries and gas, they are reorganizing the provision of hard 
goods such as fertilizers, chemicals and bulk fuel.  
4.3 PRINCE ALBERT/BRANCH RELATIONS 
The regionalization of a co-operative inevitably creates new relationships. Co-op 
members begin to associate with members from other communities that they would not 
otherwise have a chance to interact with. As noted above, managers in particular are in 
contact with people across the region, establishing important networks and identifying 
sources of information and expertise. As representatives, delegates experience firsthand 
the new co-operative structure and begin to develop a kind of regional consciousness as 
they interact with members from other communities. It is this mental imaging by 
members that Fairbairn (2004) maintains is important in developing trust within the 
organization. An important dimension of this cognitive process occurs when delegates 
share their concerns at regional meetings and listen to other delegates. Delegates who 
become board members also play a special role in these processes, as they are 
encouraged to travel to branch meetings and visit the co-op branches for themselves. 
Because delegates play a central role in building, maintaining and strengthening 
relations within the region (whether they are aware of it are not), they were asked about 
the types of interaction they had with other delegates. 
 Compared to managers, delegates had fewer opportunities to associate with their 
counterparts from other branches. The delegate body meeting was the only time 
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available for networking. Some of the respondents found the branch reports useful for 
learning more about the other co-operatives. Photographs of equipment and buildings 
that needed repair or replacement were especially helpful in better understanding the 
needs of the other co-operatives.  A number of the delegates stated that they did not have 
the time to meet with other members during meetings and subsequently were unable to 
develop relationships beyond making acquaintances. In light of this, two delegates 
suggested having some kind of social event outside the formal meetings for delegates to 
get to know one another. They acknowledged, however, that other delegates might not 
be particularly interested in such an event, as it could be perceived to be an 
encroachment on the delegates` personal time.   
4.3.1 Community Relations 
 
Overall, interviewees saw the PACA operating as a cohesive group. Delegates 
commented that they believed that the development of the PACA was a positive step for 
all branches: 
Everybody feels good about it because they know there are going to be opportunities 
because they have seen it happen on a regular basis. 
 
The co-op tries to look after the co-op as a whole and pretty much anything you do 
for the co-op as a whole is going to be good for the individual communities. Keeping 
the total healthy. 
 
Delegates were also asked if they found it difficult to make decisions knowing that they 
were representing their local branch but also making decisions for all the branches in the 
PACA. None of them saw this dual role to be a problem. They believed that generally 
what was good for one co-op was good for the entire region. Seeing the co-op as a 
regional co-operative also seems to mitigate the challenge of heterogeneity: group needs 
are typically put ahead of more individualistic demands but local needs are not ignored. 
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The success of this arrangement depends on the building of trust, as delegates 
understand that their own local co-operative’s needs will be met in due time.  
The management and board have worked at creating an equitable relationship 
among the branches of the co-operative. It appears that the tensions and small town 
rivalries one might expect to find among these communities have not affected the 
co-operative. Prioritizing branch requests and consistent communication are at the 
heart of the PACA’s success.  Delegates seemed accepting of the fact that each co-
operative had specific needs and were willing to wait their turn. Again, delegates 
were aware that their own co-operative’s needs would eventually be met although 
not necessarily on their preferred schedule. 
Some of the delegates did, however, perceive an urban bias, with the central 
operation in PA being evaluated using different criteria than the branches. One of 
the delegates noted that while the branches had to pay close attention to their 
bottom line, the Prince Albert store was given more leeway and incurred greater 
debts.  
4.3.2 Local Identity 
Part of the success of the organization with respect to community relations also 
comes from maintaining a local identity. This became apparent in discussions about 
whether people still feel as if it is the “Wakaw Co-op” or “Smeaton Co-op”, for 
example. Respondents pointed out that there were certain attempts to preserve local 
identities such as answering the telephones using the branch name rather than Prince 
Albert Co-op. Further, any new co-op trucks were decorated with the generic co-op 
insignias but there was no indication that it was a PACA vehicle. One of the delegates 
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thought keeping the local name was important to maintain local business. Without the 
local feeling he felt that people would be less interested in buying at the local co-op 
outlet and begin to support competitors. Emphasis is also placed on getting local branch 
managers and staff involved and interested in the local community. The co-op 
encourages its staff to develop close relationships with the community in which they 
work and reside. Interestingly, this emphasis on branch identity contrasts with the 
strategy implemented in southwestern Saskatchewan by the Pioneer Co-operative, which 
decided to focus on a regional identity whereby all the branches carry the Pioneer name 
(e.g. “The Cabri Branch of the Pioneer Co-op”). 
4.4 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The study investigated the responsibilities charged to delegates and committees. 
From the literature that was reviewed, the researcher assumed that the more 
responsibilities the committees and delegates have, the more control is afforded to the 
membership. For the PACA, a recurring phrase used in the interviews to describe the 
role of the delegates and committee members was that they were the “eyes and ears” of 
the community. One manager explains: 
Well I see the role of the committee members for the most part being a bit of a 
sounding board for the community. You know if there are any local issues they 
would be aware of those. And then they can relate that to our management if it is a 
management type of situation or to our board of directors if it is something to do with 
the other end of the business such as policy and things like that.  
 
Similarly a committee member explained:  
 
We are asked to give people fairly accurate information and also, if there is a 
problem or issue to direct them to who they need to be speak to. I tell them to talk to 
[the managers] at the local co-op or if it is something maybe involving the managers 
then they can speak to the [operations manager]. That’s how I understand it and to 
just bring concerns of the general public to the meetings as well. 
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Committees were also seen as a type of volunteer reserve for community fundraisers and 
social events. Committee members were asked to organize and participate in barbecue 
fundraisers or other types of co-op events. However, no real authority resides with the 
local committees. One manager commented: 
It would be nice to think of more ways to make it more interesting for the 
committees…Because they don’t really have the power to make decisions. They can 
make recommendations. You can never really change that because it ultimately has 
to be the board of directors that make the final call. 
 
Delegates as representatives have responsibilities in the regional structure in addition to 
those of committee members. They are required to attend and present local reports at 
regional meetings in Prince Albert. However, in comparing their duties and 
responsibilities of with those listed by Schomisch and Mirowsky (1981)— including 
internal maintenance, liaison and extension—it becomes evident that the delegates 
perform only a few of the roles that could be assigned to them5.  
 
Internal Maintenance 
The main duties that the delegates discharge are electing the board of directors 
and approving board reports and financial statements on behalf of members. It appears 
that delegates were not significantly involved in most of the other functions listed by 
Schomisch and Mirowsky (1981) such as changing bylaws, approving services, products 
or marketing outlets, nor were they involved in setting policy. Most of these 
responsibilities were left to the board.  
                                                 
5 Extension, as defined by the authors, is not relevant to most consumer co-operatives today and is not 
discussed in this analysis. In their definition extension refers to lobbying governments and public outreach. 
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Besides electing the board, the only issue that was brought to a delegate vote was 
amalgamations (with other stores in the PACA region). Although delegates said they had 
a chance to vote, some believed the process was pro forma and that they were essentially 
agreeing with what was presented to them rather than being involved in any meaningful 
discussions. One delegate was of the opinion that they could not make any informed 
decision about the amalgamations simply because they knew little about the 
communities and the co-operatives. He said they had to rely on what management 
presented to them in order to make the decision.  
Delegates are also asked to listen to financial reports, which some of the 
respondents said took up the majority of the time at the delegate body meetings. Again, 
interviewees surmised that they were simply listening to the reports and had no active 
involvement in the discussions. One delegate said the meeting would be more productive 
if they could receive information beforehand to be able to read it and formulate 
questions. The respondent also added that the same thing would be accomplished if 
management in Prince Albert mailed out the reports for delegates to read rather than 
having everyone meet in Prince Albert.  
It may be that the delegate body meetings perform latent roles in the co-operative. 
Holding meetings sends a statement to members that the co-op operates differently than 
other businesses by welcoming consumer input through a formal communication process.  
Additionally, management might also pay closer attention to the repercussions of its 
actions, knowing that it will need to explain its decisions directly to nearly forty people. 
Finally, the meetings may be an opportunity for managers to shape the perspectives of 
delegates in a manner that leads to greater acceptance of FCL policies or initiatives.  
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Liaison and Communication 
The co-operative seems to have developed a fairly strong line of communication 
from members to directors and management. The number of avenues available for 
communication is equal to, or greater than, would typically be available in a stand alone 
co-operative. However, in a regional co-operative a member will have to be fairly 
deliberate and assertive to be heard: 
If [branch members] want to talk to the general manager, if they want to talk to the 
board, if they want to get their message across they can write, they can email, they 
can come in and visit. They can run themselves for a board position... They can get 
their message across very easy if they choose to do so…In the long run where [there 
are] more branches and larger areas, unless those individuals are forceful and make 
those phone calls or go to the managers and ask for input and ask the questions, it is 
not going to happen… 
 
Members can bring forth concerns to three delegates and three committee 
members. They can also attend one of the annual committee meetings or contact the 
local manager or operational manager directly. Local committees are able to meet 
formally with the operational manager on average three times a year, but members are 
invited to contact managers at anytime. Delegates can take complaints or concerns from 
the membership to the board of directors if it is an issue that cannot be resolved at the 
local level.  
Delegates were asked about their role in the communication process.  Most of the 
delegates interviewed saw their role as a communicator—forming a bridge between the 
local communities and the administrative hub in Prince Albert. As liaisons, they are 
regarded as the eyes and ears for management and board and this seems to be 
functioning well. They also provide a channel for members to voice their opinion, 
although all the delegates interviewed said they receive fewer than ten comments a year. 
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Further, delegates were not proactive about soliciting members’ opinions or concerns. In 
most cases, members approached the delegates: 
It is a small enough community that most people know who sits on the board and if 
they have got something to say they’ll usually let you know. 
 
The investigation revealed that the lines of communication are somewhat 
asymmetrical. It appears that more information flows vertically upwards from 
membership to the board and management but less information is passed from 
management to members. A possible explanation for not relaying information to 
members is that some delegates found they did not learn anything new at delegate 
meetings. One commented that the information they received, such as the financial 
statement, was available to anyone via the local paper. It may also be the case that there 
is less information management can share with all its members. Information about 
managerial candidates, certain management decisions, contractual agreements, market 
surveys and analysis, etc. may all need to be kept confidential.  
However, if members are not receiving information, this raises questions with 
respect to representation. Agency theory suggests that in order for representation to be 
effective both the principal (the members) and the agent (the delegates and management) 
must be fully informed of what is taking place within the organization. In the case of the 
PACA, delegates have no means of formally relaying information to branch members. 
Only informal communication channels are used.  
In closing, it should be pointed out that despite the relatively few tasks that were 
afforded to the delegates, all but one said they did not want to have more responsibility 
within the co-op. A common thread was the lack of education, training and knowledge: 
We are not trained and we are not business people…we are not trained to make those 
types of decisions. 
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Another delegate stated:  
I don’t think that more authority or responsibility would be of any advantage because 
an average person would have to do more and understand more of how business 
works and all this kind of thing.  
 
Again, these sentiments are not unique to the delegates of the PACA. Delegates and 
board members in agricultural co-operatives and in other large retailer co-ops have made 
similar comments. As decision-making becomes more complex in more competitive, 
global markets, lay people feel less inclined to make important decisions that concern 
their co-op. Butler (1998) identifies the same problem in agricultural co-ops. While the 
management structure evolves both horizontally (more departments) and vertically 
(more management levels) to meet the complexities of the market, the membership 
structure remains relatively unchanged. Thus, boards and delegates cannot effectively 
participate. The proposed solution is to develop the membership horizontally and 
vertically. The PACA might consider developing specialized committees among the 
delegates that would focus on particular issues. This way the delegates would have the 
opportunity to participate and engage in a manner they would find meaningful.  
4.5 PARTICIPATION 
Whether the present structure encourages or thwarts member involvement depends 
on the type of participation being discussed: economic participation (use of the co-
operative) or member participation (attending meetings, voting and running in 
elections).  
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Economic Participation 
 The branch system maintains the economic participation of its members. Without 
the branch, members would be forced to travel into Prince Albert or to a neighboring 
community in order to shop—and there is no guarantee that they would shop at the co-
op. One manager felt that having the store in the community increased member loyalty 
to the co-operative. The regional structure of the PACA may also increase economic 
participation and consumer loyalty. Members can use their co-op membership number 
at any of the PACA stores and receive patronage dividends from those purchases at the 
end of the year. Some delegates that were interviewed liked the idea of being able to 
buy gas at other branches while still earning dividends on their purchases. 
 When delegates were asked if they thought members would be more willing to 
patronize the co-op in Prince Albert given that there was also an affiliated store in their 
local community, answers were about split fifty-fifty. Some delegates believed that 
members were more likely to support the Prince Albert Co-op while the other half 
thought that members would seek out the best deals regardless of what store was 
offering them.  
 
Attending Meetings 
It appears that the regional structure has not significantly altered the participation 
of members in the decision-making process. A type of reluctant participation 
characteristic of many stand-alone single establishment co-operatives is evident in the 
PACA as well. This is not to say that the organization’s structure or its size is stifling 
democratic decision-making. It is unlikely that prior to amalgamating with the PACA, 
local stand-alone co-operatives had any more success in galvanizing interest in elections 
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or annual meetings. Moreover, multi-branch systems are also experiencing a similar 
situation. Pioneer’s reaction to the low turnouts at the local meetings was to disband 
them all together.  
We used to [have local meetings] and we found that there was such poor attendance 
that it just didn’t pan out so it was discontinued…In the last number of years, 
everybody just comes into Pioneer’s annual meeting in Swift Current that is held 
normally at the end of March, and ask questions and get information there. Part of 
what used to happen was the branches wanted individual information so they were 
more zoned into their retail in their community. And what we found we kind of 
wanted them to think of Pioneer as a whole, not just as a small community.  
   
For Pioneer today, which has over 18,000 members, a good turnout at the annual 
meeting is approximately 100 people. One respondent from the PACA noted the lack of 
participation but posited that members might be using the delegates and committee 
members directly to express concerns rather than attending the meeting: 
…Unless there is some kind of controversy going on, I don’t think there is a lot of 
very active participation. Each year when we have our annual meeting in every one 
of our communities, the turnouts there are pretty typical from community to 
community. There is probably a dozen there and six of those are a combination of 
committee-delegates. So we don’t get a lot of turnout of members to come out to the 
annual meetings. It might be a case too that if they know if there is an issue or 
concern and they get a hold of the committee member, a delegate and it gets dealt 
with anyway… 
 
 It is difficult to determine whether the last assertion is accurate without surveying the 
membership. If it were true then it would suggest that the system is functioning quite 
adequately from the perspective of members.  
For the PACA, the simple process of signing people up to be a committee member 
or delegate actually compels them to participate in meetings that they might not 
otherwise attend.  Many of the delegates said they had never considered being involved 
before they were asked. Most had joined the committee because a manager or sitting 
member asked them if they would be interested. In considering the total active 
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membership, approximately forty people now attend the annual delegate body meeting 
in Prince Albert. Along with the eight local committees, each with three additional 
committee members this yields a total of 64 members who are participating actively.  
While not large, this number is not insignificant.  
Moreover, participation as a delegate may potentially lead to greater interest. If 
this were true, it would be a group which some analysts have called co-op “true 
believers” i.e. members who have an interest in the business and will run for elections 
(Birchall & Simmons, 2004). The PACA could focus on these people to build a solid 
group of members who are willing to work on developing the organization. The group 
might be invited to take a more regional approach to “community development” by 
working together on co-op fundraisers, social events or some other activities. Such a 
core group of regional members might also be more energized and ready to work on 
larger projects (with perhaps more funding) that benefit the entire region rather than just 
individual communities. In this way, members would be more actively participating in 
the associational aspects of the co-op even if they cannot participate more in the 
business decision-making.  
 
Voting and Elections 
It should be first pointed out is that what appears to be fair representation within 
the PACA —an equal number of delegates for each branch (with the exception of the 
Prince Albert hub)—does not in fact follow the one-member one-vote principle. 
Members elect their local committees, who then elect the delegates. Delegates, however, 
do not represent a proportional number of members. A small community such as 
Domremy sends the same number of delegates to PA as La Ronge and Air Ronge that 
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have a much larger total membership. Schomisch and Mirowsky (1981) state that voting 
using a delegate system is more equitable if proportional voting is used. That is, the 
more members a delegate represents the more votes he or she should have. Utilizing a 
system where all branches have an equal number of votes may appear to be fair in 
relation to the co-operatives themselves, but it is not entirely equitable if individual 
members are considered. On the other hand, this type of voting system, which is 
essentially one-co-op one-vote, may reflect the need for simplicity and the desire to 
recognize the co-op branches as equals.  
None of the delegates that were asked about the issue considered the voting 
structure to be a problem. They thought that keeping a simplified voting system was 
effective. A point made by one of the delegates was that if they were engaged in key 
decision-making it may matter but because they voted on very few issues, the issue of 
proportional voting was not a concern. Proportional representation would also mean that 
each branch would be required to keep track of member numbers to determine the 
correct number of delegates they could send to the regional meetings. The problem of 
proportional representation may not be significant now but the co-operative needs to 
consider the implications should a controversial issue arise in the future (such as closing 
a branch).  
That being said, very few elections or votes actually take place within the co-
operative. Local branch committees rarely attract any more members than those who are 
already part of the committee. Delegates generally gain their posts through acclamation. 
Board members usually go through uncontested. The following comment is illustrative:  
Once in awhile we can convince more than one [person to run] for a 
position…usually we have two vacancies per year and we have difficulty in getting 
enough interest to get them filled.  
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Voting on specific issues is a rare occurrence for delegates or committee 
members. Delegates who have attended the delegate body meetings over several terms 
only remember voting on amalgamations. None of the delegates talked about any form 
of voting at local committee meetings either. Local meetings are predominantly a time 
for listening to reports from the operational manager.  
The lack of interest in running for board positions may be partially explained by 
competing time commitments. As one former board member stated, the position 
generally suits retired people’s lifestyles as opposed to working people or people with 
families. A second reason pertains to the size of the PACA, as it is difficult to convince 
delegates from the more distant branches to run for the board. La Ronge, for one, has 
never had a representative on the board, despite efforts (such as changing meeting times, 
and providing mileage) to make the position more attractive. 
In conclusion, the co-operative has done an adequate job in maintaining 
economic participation. Stores are generally well maintained, and well stocked; products 
are relatively well priced and the stores appear responsive to community needs. 
Membership participation on the other hand is somewhat lacking —a problem not 
unique to the PACA. Butler (1988) suggests that delegates represent vertical integration 
in the co-operative, but the PACA has yet to implement any form of horizontal 
integration (such as special committees), which she argues, can improve member 
participation. 
  There is literature that also suggests the wisdom of focusing on the local outlets 
and developing participation there. This is an area where the PACA has already had 
some success and could develop further given the relatively autonomous stores it 
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operates in each of the communities. The co-operative could look at activities in which 
the local committees could be more involved. These might include, for example, 
identifying priorities for local community investments, performing social audits, 
participating in community activities, and sharing local initiatives with other branches in 
the PACA. There is some evidence of this occurring within the region already. One 
respondent said that her committee was involved in deciding how the community 
donations would be distributed but it did not appear that this practice took place 
throughout the entire PACA region. 
4.6  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DELEGATE SYSTEM 
 
Some of the members admitted that they had never thought about why delegates 
were being used in the PACA. Although delegates did not directly raise the issue of 
democracy they did mention things such as “giving everybody and equal chance to bring 
forth concerns” encouraging participation and having representation in PA. One 
manager stated:  
I guess because we are so spread out it is probably the most democratic way to do it 
because each individual location can get their delegates into there so there is a good 
balance of every community being at the delegate meeting where our board of 
directors come from.  
 
Two interviewees suggested delegates were being used mostly to meet the formal 
expectations of a co-op, stating that it was a requirement under the Co-operative Act: 
…As far as I am concerned, I am just filling in the requirements of the Co-op Act. Now 
I have never sat down and read the Co-op Act but I am sure what it says is that you must 
have two meetings a year with the delegates. So when I go there that is what I am doing. 
I am fulfilling the requirements of the Act. I don’t see my attendance changes anything 
other than maybe when it comes to over the last few years they have voted in some new 
local co-ops. 
 
 90
Delegates were asked to consider their role and determine whether they felt as if 
the delegate body was an effective part of the PACA. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
the delegates interviewed were split almost evenly. However, if the initial phone calls to 
potential interview participants (i.e. four declined the interview stating they felt they 
didn’t have anything to share) are included, more respondents indicated that the 
delegates are ineffective. The discrepancies among the delegates may be explained, in 
part, as an outcome of interpreting their roles in the organization differently. Those who 
see themselves as the eyes and ears of the community would in most cases perceive 
themselves to be fulfilling that role. However, delegates with greater expectations would 
likely see themselves as being largely ineffective within the organization. 
4.7 PACA STRUCTURE: NETWORK FEDERATION AND TRIARCHY 
Although the basic structure of the PACA might be described as a centralized co-
operative, the relationships that have emerged within the PACA can be best summarized 
as a type of federated network, with characteristics of a triarchy.  
4.7.1 Federated Networks 
 
With the regard to federated networks, despite the fact that the branches do not 
own or control the central in PA, the PACA still meet many of the criteria for a network 
federation as identified by Développement International Desjardins (2005): 
Shared resources: The Prince Albert Co-op and the branches share many 
resources with each other. Obviously one of the primary reasons for amalgamating was 
to gain access to training, accounting and management services. Similar sharing of 
resources may occur between individual stand-alone co-operatives (who are members of 
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FCL) but it may not lead to the same degree of integration or intensity as witnessed in 
the PACA. The benefits of sharing these services are considerable. For example, two 
operations managers now work with the eleven branches of the PACA.   
Further, the co-op managers are expanding and building on existing service-
sharing arrangements. One example is bulk fuel delivery.  Rather than each branch outlet 
and the PA Co-op owning their own equipment, they share delivery trucks and truck 
drivers. Products are also shared among branches. If one outlet is not selling a particular 
product it may be moved to a different location where it can be sold. Additionally, the 
size of the PACA and its purchasing power gives it some leverage in dealing with the 
wholesale provider, FCL. By combining orders, the PACA can negotiate better deals on 
its purchases. The same leverage principle also applies to negotiating or offering better 
contracts to employees, particularly high-level managers. As stated, attracting managers 
to smaller co-ops and communities is increasingly becoming an arduous task.  
Standardized systems: Branch and central operations are more standardized 
including accounting, hiring practices, pricing, marketing and products. The 
standardization of policies and norms is instituted, in part, by establishing a board that 
consists of delegates from across the region. The inclusion of local co-ops in at least 
some policy decisions develops strength across the region. Although the products that 
are available are standardized, the managers do have some leeway in choosing the 
products that suit their members the best. There is obviously a fine line between 
standardization and control. Federated networks must balance the need for 
standardization and the need for subsidiarity, which is discussed below.  
Contractual solidarity is also evident within the PACA although not as strongly 
as the other criteria. The central has control over where new services will be located and 
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coordinates branch services to reduce competition among the locals. This is probably an 
easier process in the PACA compared to a federation where the base units maintain 
greater autonomy and control over their operations. The central co-op in PA also 
manages the dividends from FCL and the patronage dividends allocated to individual 
members6.  
The last criterion is strengthening governance through internal strategies and 
regulations.  This includes establishing opportunities for base units (or branches) to 
participate in the decision-making.  Delegates and committees represent specific 
strategies for including branches in the decision-making of the PACA. Although some 
delegates question their effectiveness, there is at least an attempt within the PACA to 
include branch interests in the decision-making.  
Federated networks can also follow the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity 
refers to giving the base units the opportunity to do what they can on their own. The 
central organization only intervenes if the base units are unable perform. The principle is 
somewhat harder to follow in a branch system where the base unit (the branch) has 
joined because they need the guidance or assistance of the larger co-operative in Prince 
Albert. Nonetheless, there does seem to be a sharing of responsibility between the 
branches and the Prince Albert Co-op.  Examples of subsidiarity occurring within the 
PACA are presented in the following section on triarchies. 
                                                 
6PACA members receive an allocation based on a percentage of their purchases. The percentage is the 
same regardless of what store in the PACA those purchases were made.  With respect to FCL patronage 
allocation, the dividends are paid to the central administration in PA as a combined total. What each co-op 
earned is calculated and this information is shared with delegates and branch managers. The information is 
used mainly for appraising managers and to assess whether the branch is making or losing money (before 
and after the FCL patronage allocation). 
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4.7.2 Triarchy 
 
With a combination of base unit/branch representation, central coordination and 
at least a degree of subsidiarity, the PACA may be considered a triarchy—combining 
heterarchy, hierarchy and responsible autonomy. As with other co-operatives, the 
hierarchical decision-making is especially evident on the management side of the 
organization as illustrated in Butler`s (1988) model. The management has a clear line of 
authority and decisions are typically made from the top down.  
The delegate structure, local committees and the board of directors comprise the 
heterarchy, where groups are integrated into the decision-making (but not in the day-to-
day operations). Voting is a key mechanism for introducing heterarchy into the PACA. 
Maintaining a heterarchy can involve more organizational work than is required for a 
hierarchy. Up until now, the PACA has committed to holding a large number of 
meetings a year. The effort made in communicating through local committee meetings, 
delegate body meetings, managerial meetings is indicative of a heterarchy. Management 
also maintains some level of heterarchical decision-making as branch managers, 
operations managers and the managers in Prince Albert can all participate meaningfully 
in the decision-making. 
The PACA has also introduced some level of responsible autonomy into its 
operations. Responsible autonomy is closely related to subsidiarity where base units 
operate relatively autonomously. Within the PACA, managers have some independence 
to operate their stores including hiring of staff (below the managerial position), ordering 
products from FCL, and selecting products for local sales. Most managers and even 
supervisors interviewed stated they felt as if it was their store and were trusted to make 
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relevant decisions locally. The following comments by different managers are 
illustrative: 
Each location, including the branches, and the independent locations in Prince Albert 
all place their own orders directly through Federated and the trucks are scheduled 
and loaded and run out to the various locations. 
 
They also kind of let us run our own store and let us do what we think is right. 
In some ways it is almost like it’s my store. We do a budget, which is approved by 
Prince Albert. And I have a fairly free hand on how I achieve that budget. If there is 
a problem we let PA know about it immediately – in some cases for advice and 
sometimes to let them know that this is happening so they know what is going on.  
 
[Management in PA] is actually very lenient. They know that I know what my 
customers would want so they usually just take my word for it. Like I build my 
shelves. I build my displays. I bring in what I know my customers will buy.  
 
…Currently any of the branch locations are people that are hired in conjunction with 
the operations manager but it is done locally. So people in La Ronge, do their own 
advertising, take their own applications, do their own interviewing and hire. And 
depending on the position, the operations manager might or might not be involved. 
 
Of course they have to stay within our policies but yes they have a very free hand and I 
would say that is why we keep a lot of our managers for long-term is because they feel 
that ownership and they know that they do have the power to make certain decisions and 
so on and feel comfortable with it and then just to advise us. And there are times that they 
have to advise us before they do it of course depending on what type of a situation it is but 
generally we are going with their recommendations almost a hundred percent unless it is 
something off the wall but that doesn’t happen very often.  
 
Some delegates also supported these comments: 
 
Our local managers run our store. They wouldn’t be able to get a $500,000 cooler 
system on their own but our community store is run be our managers here basically 
99 percent on their own.   
 
There was also indication that local committees also had some autonomy in deciding 
how local donations were to be spent: 
Sometime at every branch, through the summer we'll host a BBQ for the day, and 
it's up to that branch committee as to where they want it to go — to a swimming 
pool or playground or some local event.  
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However, other delegates believed that decisions about local donations were in the hands 
of managers rather than committee members. Regardless who has the final say, these 
comments suggest that at least the decision is local.   
One might expect that local autonomy will spark innovation within the region—
managers introducing new initiatives and sharing them with other managers in the co-
operative. When asked about this, managers agreed that there was innovation but were 
unable to provide any examples. This might suggest that the local branch managers are 
not “pushing the limits” and more or less going by the book. It may also reflect an 
imbalance of power between the central and the branches.  Branches are likely to be 
subject to greater ‘encapsulation’ (internal rules and boundaries) and ‘critique’ 
(reporting and evaluation) than a co-operative would be as a member-owner in a 
federation. The lack of innovation may also stem from the fact that branch managers are 
comparatively less experienced than the managers in PA and are more willing to follow 
their lead. Finally, it may also be that a lot of the innovations that are taking place are 
relatively small and managers may fail to notice such initiatives.  
4.8 SUMMARY  
 
Most of the small rural retail co-operatives that now make up the branches of the 
PACA were motivated to amalgamate with the larger co-operative in Prince Albert 
primarily out of necessity. The realities of small-town Saskatchewan have made it 
increasingly difficult for small, stand-alone co-operatives to operate without setting up 
some kind of partnership with neighboring co-ops. The more recent amalgamations 
came about because the smaller co-ops could no longer attract qualified managers. By 
joining the larger co-op, these outlets may be able to operate effectively without a local 
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manager. Instead, one staff member does some of the work that the manager would 
typically do and is guided closely by the operations manager who oversees all of the 
branches.  
The academic literature on co-operatives discusses problems concerning the size of 
co-ops and the heterogeneity of membership. However, the delegates and managers that 
were interviewed did not feel that the increasing size of the PACA was a concern and in 
fact most saw it to be a positive. The advantages of a larger co-op—stability, economies 
of scale and the spreading of risk—outweighed any potential concerns about growth. It 
is surmised that part of the reason why delegates feel comfortable with growth is that 
local branch co-ops experience few negative changes even as the PACA grows in size 
and in fact, they are able to recognize a number of positive developments. Also, 
additional mergers do not significantly impact the relationship between branch members 
and their branch.  
Delegates were the primary focus of this study and they were asked to discuss their 
role within the PACA. It was discovered that the extent of their responsibilities did not 
go much beyond attending delegate body meetings in Prince Albert and electing the 
board of directors. Nonetheless, few of the delegates interviewed thought they should be 
charged with more responsibilities given the complexities of the retail environment.    
Delegates may serve the co-operative in more subtle ways. They play a key role in 
preserving the heterarchy of the co-op. They at least symbolize the intent of the co-
operative to be more inclusive in how decisions are made. All branches are represented 
and all branches have the opportunity to have greater influence in the decision-making 
of the co-op if their delegates run for and are elected to a position on the board. Branch 
members as directors can help to set policy and provide oversight for management. A 
 97
combination of branch and PA delegates comprise the current board, and it appears that 
there is an unwritten policy to achieve a similar balance in the future.  
The real challenge for the multi-branch co-operative is to find an appropriate 
division of power between the branches and the central co-op in Prince Albert. Large 
federated networks operate effectively when they can find some sort of balance between 
centralization and decentralization. A branch system operates under a different set of 
conditions as the central assumes more control than in a federation. The PACA could 
concentrate on the principles of subsidiarity and responsible autonomy to ensure the 
continued viability, attractiveness, and local identity of the branch operations.  
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Chapter 5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The Prince Albert Co-operative Association has developed into a regional 
organization not out of immediate economic necessity per se, but in response to a 
managerial staffing problem that seems to be pervasive throughout the co-operative 
retailing system in Saskatchewan. Little opposition has come from the membership 
about their local co-op joining the PACA, as the advantages of amalgamating seem to 
outweigh any loss of control or autonomy that the local co-ops may have experienced. 
Specific advantages that have been identified through this study include: stability, 
economies of scale, risk sharing, and positive growth and development throughout the 
regional network of co-op stores and service centres.  
In addition, the PACA has been able to grow without negatively affecting the local 
branches. Branch members of the consumer co-operative have witnessed few changes to 
their relationship with the local store. Although this study does not focus specifically on 
regular members of the co-op it would seem that for members as consumers, the 
restructuring has not negatively impacted service delivery. In the case of groceries and 
gas stations, the service functions (information, expertise, social and physical) all remain 
within the community. Ultimately, for most of the local co-operatives the sharing of 
resources and services among the branches has meant that the number of services has 
actually increased. The associational relationship with the local co-op has remained 
relatively stable for members as well.  Although turnouts to meetings at the local 
branches are low, this problem is does not necessarily relate to the size of the PACA, as 
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most co-ops —big or small, multi-branch or stand-alone —have experienced similar 
problems. Yet, opportunities still exist for members to participate. The PACA has 
maintained the lines of communication between members and management. The 
relatively large number of meetings held each year is one example of the commitment 
made to keeping communications open. The co-op now has to address the asymmetrical 
flow of that information. The delegates perform their role as the eyes and ears for the 
board and management adequately but information from the board and management 
does not seem to flow as well to members. Delegates do not appear to have any formal 
ways to pass information on to local members.  
PACA members see it as a community resource and are buoyed by the success of 
the organization, which has yet to close a branch. The PACA is now one of the largest 
consumer co-operatives in the province and represents a positive story for the region. 
Stores remain open and few services are cut in the smaller communities; new stores are 
being built and members are excited to see modern buildings constructed in their towns. 
One might speculate that the success of the regional co-operative network may 
contribute to the emergence of a regional identity, and may lead to communities looking 
at other forms of collaboration. 
Much of the strength of the PACA has come from adopting some of the 
principles of federated networks or triarchies. The key principle in both organizational 
structures is to distribute power more evenly in the organization compared to more 
standard hierarchical businesses. The PACA has centralized some services and 
responsibilities with the central co-op in PA taking on specific responsibilities for 
coordination and supervision. But complete centralization has yet to occur. Delegates 
still play a key part in providing local branches the opportunity to participate in the 
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decision-making of the PACA and branch managers have some control over their own 
stores. The PACA is also working to retain local connections by maintaining the 
association between the community name and the co-op branch.  These policies and 
practices have allowed the regional co-operative to grow and to take on more local co-
ops with little impact on local consumers and branch members.  
However, unless delegates are more integrated into the co-operative governance 
(beyond the largely symbolic participation that delegates perceive to be the current 
reality), the present membership structure may be forced to undergo changes in the 
future. If the PACA wants to maintain a somewhat decentralized branch system and 
avoid centralization it should find opportunities to involve delegates in more meaningful 
ways. Training and education should focus on this core group of members who are 
willing to play an active role in the co-op. Special committees that focus on particular 
social, member or business-related issues may also encourage members to become more 
active.  
Since the PACA is at the vanguard of co-op amalgamations and multi-co-
operative development in Saskatchewan, it serves as an example for similar 
developments that will inevitably occur across Western Canada. It is hoped that this 
study provides some insights for co-ops that are looking for ways to adapt to the changes 
occurring in the retail sector and in the complex rural environment.  
5.2 IMPLICATIONS 
There is high probability that co-operatives in Saskatchewan and across Canada 
will continue to amalgamate with neighboring co-ops well into the future. Therefore, 
this research has wider implications for future co-op development. This study supports 
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Pestoff and Butler when they assert that large co-operatives do not necessarily preclude 
democratic decision-making. Branches can be included in the overall development of the 
co-operative if there is the desire and concerted action, and branch members can play a 
useful and constructive role in oversight and policy development. The study also 
supports the suggestion that larger co-operatives should focus especially on the local co-
op outlets if they wish to avert many of the dilemmas that normally confront large co-
operatives. In order to promote and integrate local branches, co-ops need to find a 
reasonable balance between centralization and decentralization. This implies adopting 
and adapting the principles of federated networks and triarchies. 
Co-operative members appear to be generally ready to relinquish some local 
control in order to gain control and sustainability at a regional level. For many people, 
the region has become the new local and co-operatives must now reconsider the 
local/regional relationship. The PACA is building an integrated system, in the 
operational sense, among the branches and the central hub in PA, and among the various 
managers, but it appears that relationship building on the associational side of the co-
operative has not developed as far. Because building relationships is important for 
building sustainable network structures, it seems more could to be done to link members 
together. The PACA may wish to look at how delegates can be used to strengthen 
members’ interactions at the regional level. The regional structure also brings up 
questions of power and how it is divided at the regional and local levels. The multi-
branch co-operative, as a federated network, requires the ability to share responsibilities 
between the local co-op branches and the larger co-operative situated in Prince Albert, 
and this division of power must be continuously revisited and negotiated.  
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5.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
Although there have been numerous studies done on the membership structures for 
large agricultural co-operatives, there are few studies dealing with consumer co-
operatives and their use of delegate systems. This research provides a better 
understanding of how some regional consumer co-operatives operate on a larger scale.  
I am not aware of any scholarly writing that has employed the theory of 
triarchies in analyzing co-operatives. This is significant since, I would argue, this 
conceptual tool could advance our understanding of co-operatives as complex 
organizations. With the increasing number of branch systems used in consumer co-
operatives and credit unions across Canada, triarchy theory can provide a useful 
framework for further analysis. Moreover, though Fairtlough (2005) maintains that there 
are growing numbers of organizations looking to institute heterarchical decision-making 
and responsible autonomy it is notable that there was no mention of co-operatives in his 
book on triarchies. The present study suggests that co-operatives could be a model for 
integrating all three ways of getting things done (i.e. hierarchies, heterarchies and 
responsible autonomy) in many kinds of social and commercial enterprises.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
With any masters thesis there are limitations to the scope of the study. The field 
research focused exclusively on delegates and managers. If more “ordinary” members 
(who may not identify with the regional co-op as much as delegates) were interviewed, 
or if a region-wide survey of members were conducted, it would have increased the rigor 
of the study. How do regular members view the regional co-operative and their local 
branch? Is the co-op seen as just another store? Are members aware that their co-op 
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belongs to a multi-branch regional co-operative? Including more members would also 
have provided a better understanding of member heterogeneity. Although the study 
suggests that community diversity in the region provided some stability for the co-op, it 
was less clear what kind of impact member heterogeneity had on the development and 
governance of the regional co-operative. 
Another limitation of the study was not being able to recruit more delegates to be 
interviewed. It would have improved the study if at least one delegate from each of the 
branches could have been included. Although farmers were interviewed in the study, 
only a few delegates from agricultural-dependent communities were represented. Their 
insight could have added much to the discussion, as farm members not only purchase 
groceries and gas but also bulk fuel, fertilizers and chemicals, equipment and other farm 
supplies from the PACA. As stated, timing might have been a key factor as interviews 
began at the peak of seeding time.  
Despite the limitations, the study presents a number of promising areas for future 
research. While this research offered only a cursory look at another multi-branch retail 
co-operative based in Swift Current, it would be informative and revealing to do a 
comparative analysis of the Prince Albert Co-operative Association and the Pioneer Co-
operative, which now has branches in several communities in southwestern 
Saskatchewan. The two co-ops are comparable in size and in the number of branches, 
but have taken different directions in terms of membership/governance structures. 
Pioneer has elected to forego the delegate structure and use only a regional annual 
meeting. It also has a very different approach in terms of philosophy. Whereas the 
PACA focuses on maintaining individual branch identities, Pioneer is striving to have all 
branches operate as one cohesive unit under one name.  
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An added dimension for this study (or as a separate project) would have been to 
investigate the pre-amalgamation process by studying the newest members of the 
PACA—the Marcelin and Canwood co-ops. The time when a co-op elects to 
amalgamate represents a critical juncture in its history. The decision sets an entirely new 
trajectory for the co-op, for the members, and for the community as well. Learning more 
about the decision-making and negotiations that go on among members of a stand-alone 
co-op would provide a valuable service for other co-ops contemplating a merger.  
Another avenue for future research would be to compare a community that has 
voted down a decision on amalgamation with one that voted in favor. This would help to 
increase our understandings of motivators and detractors for mergers and we could gain 
insights into the cognitive process of members. Moreover, it would have been interesting 
to compare the PACA delegates’ responses today with their perspectives before their 
own store amalgamated with the Prince Albert Co-op. Were they as receptive to the idea 
of amalgamating then as they are now? This is an important question considering that 
there are still many co-op members in rural Saskatchewan that are opposed to even the 
thought of their co-op store merging with stores in neighboring communities.  
This study looked at amalgamations of a relatively large co-op with 
comparatively smaller co-op stores. It would be intriguing to look at amalgamations 
between two or more like-sized enterprises (e.g. two small, stand-alone co-ops) and 
investigate the types of relations that emerge within the larger enterprise. It may be that 
such an amalgamation would require more negotiating with respect to the sharing of 
power and resources compared to the PACA case. Another study could investigate 
multi-branch co-ops in different geographic settings. Examples might include co-ops 
that operate entirely within a city or within communities that are all agricultural-
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dependent. And certainly the closing of a branch would be another informative area of 
research. Even though this has never occurred in the PACA, it has happened in Pioneer 
Co-op. 
Although this thesis makes reference to the Aboriginal people in the area, it does 
not focus on their relationships with the PACA. A targeted investigation could reveal the 
attitudes of First Nations and Métis towards the co-op. It would be an important step in 
learning why Aboriginal people have yet to play a significant role in the governance of 
the PACA despite the fact that Prince Albert and many branch communities have a large 
Aboriginal population.  
Overall, the study presents a vehicle for understanding co-operative development 
in the context of rural and retail restructuring. It reveals that delegate systems, new 
forms of governance, and branch networks were developed in response to complex and 
interrelated environmental influences.  The importance co-operatives place on 
democratic decision-making and commitment to community is also highlighted, as the 
PACA works to keep local stores open and community members involved and engaged.
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Questions for semi-structured phone interviews 
 
 
Delegates 
How long have you been a member of the co-op?  
 
When and how did you become a delegate (elected, appointed)? 
 
Why did you choose to serve as a delegate? 
 
Are elections held for the delegate position? 
 
What is the length of term for delegates? 
 
Can you describe your role as a delegate? What are your specific responsibilities? 
 
Why do you think the delegate system is being used in the PACA? 
 
Do you feel that the delegates should have more responsibility and authority? If so, what 
would other responsibilities or powers do you think the delegates should have? 
 
Can you describe the local committee – how often it meets, what kinds of issues are 
discussed, what kinds of decisions or recommendations are made? 
 
What are some of the barriers or obstacles for people wanting to become a delegate? 
 
Do you receive any kind of reimbursement for your travels or time? 
 
What are some of the challenges of being a delegate? 
 
I understand that as a delegate in the PACA you are asked to make decisions based on 
what is best for the region. However, as a delegate you are also responsible to represent 
your local co-op. Have you ever found it difficult to reconcile the two seemingly 
opposite roles? 
 
Questions about the regional co-operative 
What are some of the advantages and disadvantages being part of the PACA for your 
local co-op? 
 
Could you describe some of the major issues that have confronted the PACA during 
your term as a delegate? How were these issued resolved? 
 
Do you feel that being part of the larger PACA network encourages innovation or 
increases the exchange of ideas among co-operatives that wouldn’t have occurred if the 
co-operatives were independent?  
 
 116
Can you tell me about an idea that a branch came up with which was then used 
throughout the PACA? 
 
Would you like to see more branches included in the PACA? Why or why not? 
 
Would you be willing to keep a local branch open even if it was losing money? Why or 
why not? 
 
Do you feel there should be equal representation from each of the branches or should 
larger co-op branches have more delegates? 
 
Could you tell me how much you were involved in the discussions about the 
construction of the new co-op in La Ronge? In your opinion was it a positive 
development for the PACA? 
 
Have you ever felt that this PACA structure creates competition among the branches? 
For example, are do you compete for funds, resources, management’s time, etc.? 
 
Have you ever felt that PA has too much say in how your co-op is operated? 
 
Have you ever felt as if the branches had too much say in the operations of the other 
branches? 
 
Has the PACA allowed for your local co-op branch to keep its identity or do you feel as 
if your branch is losing its identity? 
 
Would you recommend other smaller co-ops merge with a larger co-op (not necessarily 
with PACA)? Why? 
 
 
Member/Community Diversity 
Could you describe the members of the local co-operative (e.g. are they 
farmers/retirees/commuters? How does this differ from other communities that are part 
of the  PACA network with local branches of the co-op? 
 
Do you feel that the delegates represent the diversity of members in the region? 
 
Your local co-op branch is closer/farther from Prince Albert and smaller/larger 
compared to the other branches. How does this impact your co-op branch? 
 
Do you feel that the needs of your local members differ from the needs of members from 
the other communities in this PACA network? 
 
How does the PACA encourage diverse groups to participate  (women, youth, 
Aboriginal)? 
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Have you ever thought that there were too many or too few different opinions to make a 
good decision as a delegate body? 
 
How are diverse opinions dealt with at annual meetings? 
 
Do you feel as if the branches and PA share a common vision? 
 
Do you see any of the following as an obstacle or asset in decision-
making/communication within your local co-op: the distance between members, age, 
education levels, objectives for using the co-op, etc.? 
 
Are there any problems in decision-making based on the difference among 
communities? Do you see any of the following being an obstacle to decision-
making/communication within the PACA: size, proximity to PA, the type of community 
(agriculture, forestry, etc.)? 
 
Communication 
Do you feel there needs to be more communication among the branches and within the 
PACA as a whole? If so how would like to see the communication take place (e.g. more 
meetings, phone calls among delegates)? 
 
Do you feel that you are provided with enough information from management that you 
can make informed decisions about the co-operative? If not how could you receive more 
information (e.g. more meetings, more reports)? 
 
Besides the local committees are there any other committees that are part of the PACA 
(e.g. youth, women, Aboriginal)? What types of committees would you like to see 
implemented, if any?  
 
Would you like to see fewer committees? Fewer meetings? 
 
Do you feel the present membership structure (local committees, delegates) encourages 
member participation? If not, what could be done to improve participation?  
 
Do you feel that the decision-making process is too slow or too complicated? If so, how 
could you improve the process? 
 
Has the PACA ever tried other ways of decision-making besides the local committees 
and the delegate system? 
 
How often do you meet with the GM? How often do you meet with the Branch 
Manager? 
 
Besides the local committee meetings, what other formal or informal ways of 
communication do local members have? 
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Do you feel that the present membership structure allows members to adequately voice 
their opinions?  
 
How are the decisions made by the PACA communicated to the members of the local 
branch? 
 
How involved are the delegates in setting policy of the PACA? 
 
How much sharing of information about each co-op goes on at the annual meetings? 
 
Have you ever considered meeting directly with the other delegates of branches to 
determine common needs? 
 
How often do you talk to the local members about the local co-operative? 
 
How often do you talk to PA management outside the scheduled meetings? 
 
What needs do you feel your local co-operative has that are not being met right now? 
 
What sort of new issues do you bring to the annual meetings? 
 
Could you describe a time when the delegate body was faced with a difficult decision 
and how that decision was finally made? 
 
Do you feel as if you are adequately consulted before decisions are made by the 
management? 
 
How many comments/complaints/suggestions do you receive from members a year? 
None 0-10 10-20  more than 20 
 
Do you ever seek out member opinions? If so, how do you do it? 
 
Control 
In your opinion, do you think that the present governance structure (i.e. the local 
committees and the delegate system) maintains a measure of control in the hands of 
local members? 
 
Where are most of the major decisions made about your local co-op? 
 
Do you ever feel that there is an urban bias in the decisions that are made? 
 
Have there ever been discussions with respect to closing your branch?  
 
Was there ever a time that you felt like a decision that was made by the management 
was not in the best interest of your local co-operative? 
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If there were other co-operatives wanting to join the PACA, how would that decision be 
made? 
 
Could you describe some of the major issues that have confronted the PACA during 
your time as delegates? How were these issued resolved? 
 
What are some of the advantages and disadvantages being part of the PACA for your 
local co-op? 
 
Additional Questions for Managers 
Could you tell me about the relationship between FCL and your local co-op? E.g. does 
your local co-op send a delegate to the FCL annual meetings/Do you order directly from 
FCL or do all orders go through PA? 
 
Have the operations, policies and products been standardized across the region or are 
there differences among the branches? For example are hiring practices the same? Are 
there differences in marketing (Do you share the same flyer or newsletter)? Do most co-
ops stock the same products? 
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Interview Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled “Governance, Membership and 
Community: Developing a Regional Consumer Co-operative in Saskatchewan” 
 
My name is:  Dwayne Pattison, MA Candidate University of Saskatchewan 
  Centre for the Study of Co-operatives 
  University of Saskatchewan 
 
This research is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Michael Gertler 
Department of Sociology, University of Saskatchewan. If you have any questions or 
concerns please contact me at dwayne.pattison@usask.ca or by phone at 966-6660 or 
Dr. Gertler at michael.gertler@usask.ca or 966-8501. 
 
Purpose and Procedure:  
This research focuses on the branch delegates of the Prince Albert Co-operative 
Association (the PACA).  The delegates can offer a unique insight into a number of 
questions posed in the study. Specifically, I would like to focus on the decision-making 
and communication within the PACA that the delegates are involved with. The questions 
will focus on your role as a delegate, how your local co-op operates in the regional 
setting of the Prince Albert Co-operative Association and how information is 
communicated and how decisions are made. 
 
If you are in agreement, this interview will be recorded on a mini-cassette recorder or 
digital recorder and transcribed at a later date. You will be sent a copy of this transcript 
for you to review and to make any changes. You have the right to add, delete or clarify 
any part of the transcript. You may also pull out of the research at anytime. Also, please 
be aware that throughout the interview you have the right ask me to turn off the 
recording device. You also may refuse to answer any questions you wish not to answer. 
If at any time you feel uncomfortable please let me know and we can take a break or end 
the interview. The interview should take approximately one and a half hours to 
complete.  
 
Potential Risks:  
Please note that this interview involves minimal risk to you. Again your participation is 
voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at anytime. I will make every effort to try 
to ensure your anonymity and confidentiality throughout the research process.  
 
Potential Benefits:  
Your participation in this research will provide valuable information for co-operative 
development. The PACA is a unique co-operative association in that it has nine branches 
covering a very diverse geographical region. Your insights into how this association 
operates will be an important part in future co-operative development of this nature in 
other regions across Canada.  
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Storage of Data:  
In accordance with the university guidelines, the transcript and cassette recordings will 
be placed in the care of Dr. Michael Gertler and the University of Saskatchewan for a 
minimum period of five years.  
 
Confidentiality:  
I will make every effort to ensure your confidentiality throughout the research process. 
Coding of your interview will protect your identity during the analysis of the data. In the 
published Masters Thesis and in any other published material any quotes will be 
introduced in general terms, for example, “One delegate said…” to protect your 
anonymity.  However, please be aware that because the participants for this study have 
been selected from a small group of people, all of whom are known to each other, it is 
possible that you may be identifiable to other people on the basis of what you have said. 
 
Right to Withdraw:  
As mentioned above, you have the right to withdraw at anytime without any penalty of 
any sort. Upon withdrawal all data that you have contributed will be deleted.  
 
Questions:  
Please feel free to ask my supervisor or me any questions at any time. The study was 
approved by the University of Saskatchewan Advisory Committee on Ethics in 
Behavioural Research on May 23, 2007. If you have questions regarding your rights as a 
participant please contact the Ethics Office at (306) 966-2084.  
 
You will have access to the completed study at the University of Saskatchewan Library. 
You may also ask me for a debriefing and feedback about the final draft of the projects. 
Please contact me at (306) 966-6660. You will be notified of any new information that 
comes available that may influence your decision to participate. 
 
Consent to Participate: 
I have understood the description provided. I consent to participate in the study 
described, understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time. A copy of this 
consent form has been given to me for me records. I also understand that I will have the 
opportunity to review the transcript of this interview.  
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Participant    Date 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Researcher    Date 
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Interview Transcript Release Form 
Governance, Membership and Community: Developing a Regional Consumer Co-
operative in Saskatchewan 
 
I,__________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of 
my interview responses for this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to 
add, alter, and delete information from this transcript as appropriate.  I hereby authorize 
the release of this transcript to the researcher Dwayne Pattison, University of 
Saskatchewan, to be used in the manner described in the Interview Consent Form that I 
signed before the interview, or in the manner indicated below.    
 If you do not check one of the following, it will be assumed that (a) applies: 
________ (a) I prefer to remain anonymous, as described in the consent form.  I 
understand that my remarks will not be attributed to me by name. Instead, they may be 
attributed to an unnamed individual (for example, an employee, a member, a manager, a 
Saskatchewan person, a man or woman etc.) or to a pseudonym or a composite profile. 
________ (b) The remarks contained in the authorized transcript may be attributed to me 
by name, or used anonymously, at the author's discretion. 
________ (c) I prefer to have all remarks from the authorized transcript attributed to me 
by name if they are used. 
________ (d) Certain remarks I have indicated by initials in the margin are to be kept 
anonymous as in (a) above; the rest of my comments (unmarked in the margins) may be 
attributed to me. 
 
I have received a copy of this Interview Transcript Release Form and a copy of the 
interview transcript for my own records.  
 
If you are in agreement please sign below and send one of the signed forms and one 
copy of the edited transcript to the address below in the self-addressed, stamped 
envelope provided.  
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Participant    Date 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Researcher    Date 
 
Dwayne Pattison 
Centre for the Study of Cooperatives 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon SK S7N 5B8 
966-6660 
dwayne.pattison@usask.ca 
 
 125
